vol. 31, no. 6

American

Civil Liberties

Union

Volume XXxXI

Bozman and Kepner Cases

State Board |

Grants Teach

Credentials

SAN FRANCISCO, JUNE, 1966

The State Board of Education last month granted teach-

ing credentials to Diane M. Kepner and Barbara BR. Bozman

who were arrested and convicted in the Sproul Hall sit-in

cases. Their convictions are now on appeal.

The State Committee of Credentials had turned down

both applications for credentials

but after full hearings before

hearing officers the recommenda-

tions of such officers reversing

the Committee were accepted by

the board without discussion,

Unique Situation

The favorable recommendation

of the hearing officer in the case

of Mrs. Diane Kepner was fully

reported in last month's issue of

the NEWS. Thereafter, the de

cision in the Bozman case was

handed down by Paul A. Winton,

Hearing Officer. He decided that

Miss Bozman "does not ordinarily

`or usually engage in unlawful

activities and her actions in the

Sproul Hall incident represented

a unique and probably once in a

life time situation."

- Conscientious Teacher

The ruling noted that 25-year-

old Miss Bozman held a degree

from UCLA and attended U.C. at

Berkeley between September

1963 and January. 1965 te secure

her teaching credential, While

enrolled at Berkeley she engaged

in practice teaching and volun-

teered to do student teaching of

culturally deprived children un-

der difficult circumstances, She

coped very well with these prob-

Jems and displayed a high degree

of conScientiousness in this en-

deavor." The Hearing Officer al-

so noted that Miss Bozman had

also "done voluntary tutoring of

underprivileged children in the

Hunters Point area of San Fran-

cisco."

Act of Protest

The Hearing Officer concluded

that Miss Bozman participated in

the Sproul] Hall incident because

"she sincerely believed that stu-

dents had the right to peace-

fully petition and request the

University Administration to

hear and discuss various matters

relating to student activities. Re-

spondent refused to voluntarily

leave the building in question

after regular business hours after

being requested so to do for the

reason that University officials

had refused to discuss these mat-

ters and her presence in said

edifice was an act of protest

against what she considered an

arbitrary denial of her right to

petition and assembly. Respon-

dent would willingly have left

Said premises if there had been

any indication by the University

Administation to listen and dis-

cuss such student grievances, Re-

spondent at no time had any in-

tention by her actions to tempo-

rarily disrupt the normal func-

tioning of said University, Her

actions were motivated by what

she felt was her constitutional

rights of freedom of petition and

speech."

Unjust School Board Action

During the course of the hear-

ing Miss Bozman was questioned

concerning her attitudes and con-

templated actions where she

might feel some action of her lo-

cal school board was unjust, She

testified that she would first dis-

cuss such matters with other

teachers, "She would not consid-

er an activity which would inter-

fere with the functioning of her

schoo] and specifically would not

resort to a `teacher sit-in' ... Re-

spondent would not consider re-

sorting to any irregular or illegal

action unless all regular avenues

and channels proved fruitless, un-

less the matter was of extreme

importance and involved a basic

or fundamental matter and unless

a substantial number of people

felt the way she did. The nature

of such actions would be limited

to such things as picketing, publi-

cizing or enlisting support

through the use of petitions, It

was not established that respon-

dent would exceed these types of

remedies."

Conflict of Law and Morality

The Hearing Officer also found

that Miss Bozman "is of the

opinion that there are certain un-

usual occasions when morality

comes into conflict with the law

and because of the gravity of the

problem involved morality in her

judgment should govern, Respon-

dent, however, would not neces-

sarily break the law to achieve

such goals but would reserve

her judgment to decide what

action was applicable at that par-

ticular time."

Volunteer ACLUNC attorney

Neil F. Horton of Oakland repre-

sented both Mrs.

Miss Bozman.

Civil Liberties

Seminar at U.C.

Extension June 21

University of California Ex-

tension is offering a seminar on

"Recent Supreme Court Devel-

opments in Civil Liberties and

Civil Rights" at Richardson Hall

in San Francisco on Tuesday and

Thursday evenings for ten meet-

ings beginning June 21.

The course is under the direc-

tion of Ephraim Margolin, San

Francisco attorney, a member of

the ACLU branch board and a

stimulating lecturer. He has

given similar courses at U.C. ex-

tension with marked success.

The course will cover loyalty

oaths, pornography, libel and

slander, legislative investiga-

tions, freedom of association,

school prayers, reapportionment

of federal and state legislatures,

de facto segregation of schools,

protection against unreasonable

searches and seizures, the right

to counsel, self-incrimination,

and problems of poverty in ad-

ministration of justice. In addi-

tion, the students will study in

_ depth several subjects now pend-

ing before various appellate

courts: Proposition 14, the sit-in

cases and the theories behind the

impending action against federal

aid to parochial schools.

The registration fee is $35. The

size of the class is limited. Reg-

istrants must have a bachelor's

degree or special permission of

the instructor to attend,

Kepner and

Number 6

ACLU Supports

Expelled

Teamster

A federal court action will soon

be filed by ACLU attorneys on

behalf of former member of

Teamsters Warehouse Union

Local 860, Nick Cipy, who was

expelled from the union in De-

ecember of 1965. Cipy was found

guilty of charges filed against

him by local union officials after

International Teamsters Union

President James R. Hoffa had as-

sumed original jurisdiction over

the case and appointed a special

panel to hear the charges. The

charges against Cipy are that he

engaged in malicious, slanderous

and unfounded attacks on union

officials through written broad-

sides, that he has brought charges

against union officials which have

been "proven to be unfounded by

the International Union," and

that he has harassed union offi-

cials and made insulting remarks

to them at the union hall.

Quasi-Governmenta] Powers

The Northern California board

of the ACLU took the position

that mere verbal or written abuse

of union officials could not be

the basis of expelling a person

from a union where that union

substantially controls the employ-

ment opportunities and thus exer.

cises quasi-governmental powers.

If the union did have such a

power it would be very easy for

dissident elements within the

union to be expelled on charges

that they "opposed" the union

leaders and thus stifle all free

speech and expression within the

union. Not only does the Ist

Amendment forbid such punitive

action where governmental pow-

ers are exercised, but a specific

provision of the Labor-Manage-

ment Reporting and Disclosure

Act of 1959 expressly guarantees

to union members the right of

free speech and expression and

of equal treatment and provides a

cause of action in federal court

where such rights are violated.

Reinstatement and Damages

Cipy has not been able to work

as a teamster since his expulsion

became effective and his suit

asks that he be reinstated into

the union, as if he had never

been expelled and awarded dam-

ages for the money he would

have earned had he remained in

the union as well as damages for

injury to his reputation and emo-

tional distress and embarrass-

ment. Although the ACLU does

not ordinarily bring damage ac-

tions, it does so where it is nec-

essary to protect rights of free

expression. It seems clear in this

case that. even if Cipy's charges

were unfounded, and even if he

was insulting and difficult to get

h Court Rules

nconstitution

on 14

On May 19 the California Supreme Court handed down its

opinion in seven cases in which the constitutionality of Prop.

14 was at stake. By a vote of 5-2 the court held the proposi-

tion unconstitutional for the reason that the initiative meas-

ure adopted by a vote of the people in 1964 violated the equal

protection clause of the 14th

Amendment to the U. S. Consti-

tution by forbidding the State to

enact or enforce laws prohibiting

racial discrimination in the sale

Strong Support |

In ACLU

Alcoholism Case

The United States Supreme

Court has before it the petition

of Thomas F. Budd for a writ of

certiorari challenging the power

of the State of California to pun-

ish him as a criminal for public

drunkenness when the undis-

puted evidence at his trial

showed that he was a chronic al-

coholic and that his drunkenness -

was involuntary. The filing of

this petition by ACLUNC attor-

neys stirred nationwide publicity,

almost all favorable to the ACLU

point of view. Now further sup-

port for the Budd case has been

expressed with the filing last

month of an impressive brief

amicus curiae with the Supreme

Court by lawyers with the Wash-

ington, D. C. firm of Covington and

Burling.

a

Five Groups

The friend of the court brief

was filed on behalf of the Na-

tional Council on Alcoholism, the

Washington, D. C. Area Council

on Alcoholism, the North Ameri-

can Association of Alcoholism

Programs, the Correctional As-

sociation. of New York, and the

North American Judges Associa-

tion. The brief urges the high

court to review the question of

the conviction of chronic alco-

holics for public intoxication on

the ground that "the frequency

and number of such convictions

undermine the efficiency and in-

tegrity of our municipal courts.

The fact that they occur at all

disparages the wisdom and hu-

manity of our criminal law. This

case would be an important case

meriting consideration of this

Court even if there were no prior

`decisions dealing with the same

or related questions." The brief

then goes on to describe decisions

in the Courts of Appeal for the

-Continued on Page 2

along with, it was an inappropri-

ate remedy to expel him from. the

union and deny him the right to

earn a living for these disagree-

ments. The case is being handled

by volunteer attorney Jerrold

Levitin with the assistance of

ACLU staff counsel Marshall W.

Krause.

Berkeley-Albany Chapter

BIG Picnic, July 4

All ACLUNC members, their families and their friends

are invited to join the Berkeley-Albany Chapter's second

annual BIG Pienic celebration of Independence Day, Mon-

day, July 4, at Roberts Area, Redwood Regional Park in

Oakland.

The BIG Picnic, launched last

year with over 1000 attending,

will begin at 10 am., when the

heated public pool and reserved

picnic areas open. Entertain-

ment, consisting of dancers (the

Talmy Folk Israeli Ensemble),

folksingers, and music, will start

at 1 pm. Barbara Tabler will en-

tertain the children with songs.

Picnickers may bring their own

baskets, or buy food at the park

concession, Coffee, ice cream,

and firewood will be provided.

Adult admission tickets at

$1.50 (children free) are avail-

able from Mrs. Alan Bradley,

1176 Keith Ave, Berkeley, from

all chapter chairmen, and from

the ACLUNC office, San Fran-

cisco,

Directions to Picnic

For best routes, consult a de-

tailed Bay Area street map.

Roberts Recreational Area in

Redwood Regional Park is in the

East Oakland hills, off Skyline

Boulevard, one-half mile north of

Joaquin Miller Road.

or rental of housing by private

persons or corporations.

Majority Opinion Available

Substantial portions of the ma-

jority opinion are reprinted else-

where in the News and the ACLU

has also reproduced the entire

majority opinion which may be

obtained by sending 50c per copy

to the ACLU office, 503 Market

Street, San Francisco 94105. The

minority opinions of Justices

_ White and McComb are not re-

produced by reason of their

length but should be read for

the full picture.

ACLU in Four Cases

Attorneys for the ACLU of

Northern and Southern Califor-

nia were counsel in four of the

seven cases and can be assured

that their job is not yet over

since petitions for rehearing have

been filed in at least two of the

eases and the sponsor of the ini-

tiative, the California Real Estate

Association, has announced that

it will carry the constitutional

question to the U. S. Supreme

Court. Review in the U. S. Su-

preme Court will be by petition

for writ of certiorari which must

be filed within 90 days after the

decision on petition for rehearing

unless the time is extended by a

Justice of the Supreme Court.

Four affirmative votes are nec-

essary to bring the case to the

U. S. Supreme Court.

Undecided Questions

Even if the U. S. Supreme

Court should take the case and

even if the Court holds that the

California Supreme Court was in

error in finding a violation of the

14th Amendment, this would not

mean that Prop. 14 is necessar-

ily valid. The Supreme Court of

California specifically stated that

it did not find it necessary to dis-

cuss claims of unconstitutionality

of Prop. 14 based on California

constitutional provisions and law.

This means that questions con-

cerning the way in which the ini-

tiative measure was presented to

the people and the exact scope

and meaning of the initiative

measure would still be open for

decision by the California Su-

preme Court.

Rumford and Unruh Acts

Tf certiorari is denied then the

Rumford and Unruh Acts pre-

venting discrimination in housing

and providing a remedy either

for damages or through the Fair

Employment Practices Commis--

sion will remain in force. In any

event these laws remain in force

until the judgment of the Su-

preme Court of California is set

aside, if that is ever done.

Key Holding

The key holding of the Cali-

' fornia Supreme Court is that leg-

islative action designed to make

possible private discriminatory

practices which previously were

legally restricted is state action

depriving persons of the equal

protection of the laws under the

14th Amendment. The Court said

it was not realistic to say that

Prop. 14 was neutral and only al-

lowed private persons to discrim-

inate or not as they wished when

the known result of these private

decisions is encouragement of

racial discrimination. The Court

did not pass on `the question of

whether it would be constitu-

tional for the State merely to re-

peal the Rumford and Unruh

Acts. It is this step which the

California Real Estate Associa-

tion has said it will undertake

should its legal challenge fail.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION NEWS

Published by the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California

Second Class Mail privileges authorized at San Francisco, California

ERNEST BESIG .. . Editor

503 Market Street, San Francisco, California 94105, EXbrook 2-4692

Subscription Rates -- Two Dollars a Year

Twenty Cents Per Copy

eo 151

Ralph B. Atkinson

Dr. Alfred Azevedo

Albert M. Bendich

Leo Borregard

Rey. Richard Byfield

Prof. Robert Cole

Prof. John Edwards

Rey. Aron S. Gilmartin

Evelio Grillo

Mrs. Zora Cheever Gross

Albert Haas, Jr.

Howard H. Jewel

Ephraim Margolin

Honorary Treasurer:

Joseph S. Thompson

Honorary Board Member:

Sara Bard Field

Mrs. Gladys Brown

Mrs. Paul Couture

John J. Eagan

Joseph Eichler

Morse Erskine

Dr. H. H. Fisher

Mrs. Margaret. C. Hayes

Prof. Ernest Hilgard

Mrs. Paul Holmer _

Mrs. Mary Hutchinson

Richard Johnston

Board of Directar of the American Civil Liberics Union

of Northern California

CHAIRMAN: Prof. Van D. Kennedy

VICE-CHAIRMEN: Rabbi Alvin I. Fine

Helen Salz

SEC`'Y-TREASURER: Richard DeLancie

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Ernest Besig

GENERAL COUNSEL: Wayne M. Collins

STAFF COUNSEL: Marshall W. Krause

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT: Mrs. Pamela S. Ford

CHAPTER DIRECTOR: Mrs. Marcia D. Lang

Committee of Sponsors

John R. May

Prof. John Henry Merryman

Prof, Charles Muscatine

Rey. Robert J. O'Brien

Prof. Herbert Packer

Clarence E. Rust

John Brisbin Rutherford

Mrs. Alec Skolnick

Gregory S. Stout

Stephen Thiermann

Richard E. Tuttle

Donald Vial :

Richard J. Werthimer

Roger Kent

Mrs. Ruth Kingman

Prof. Theodore Kreps

Prof. Carlo Lastrucci

Norman. Lezin

Rey. Robert W. Moon.

Dr. Marvin J. Naman

Prof Hubert Phillips

Prof. Wilson Record

Dr. Norman Reider

`Prof. Wallace Stegner

Mrs. Theodosia Stewart

Rt. Rey. Sumner Walters

ACLU Looks for 1000

We are interested in the effort now under way to add

1000 new members to the American Civil Liberties Union of

Northern California. This institution is indispensable; for

those who believe earnestly in securing peopie from ar-

bitrary, unconstitutional acts of government, it is a flashing

sword. If there were no ACLU, the Bill of Rights would be

less a living charter than it is.

There is a variety of ACLU memberships, beginning at

$2 for students. Headquarters are at 503 Market street-

_ Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle, April 25, 1966.

Berkeley-Albany Chapter

Election Meeting

The June (election) meeting of the Berkeley-Albany Chap-

ter of ACLUNC will feature a panel discussion on conscien-

tious objection to military service, with particular reference

to the war in Vietnam.

The precise date of the evening meeting at Washington

School remains to be settled as

the NEWS goes to press. It will

take place either the third or

fourth week of June,

The business part of the meet-

ing will be devoted to the elec-

tion of a new 21-member chapter

board. ACLUNC members re-

siding in Berkeley, Albany and

Kensington whose memberships

Student Rights

Discussed in

Cal. Law Review

"Student Rights and Campus

Rules," is the subject of a sym-

posium in the March 1966 issue

of the California Law Review.

Topics and authors include:

"Governance of the University:

Rules, Rights and Responsibili-

ties)? py Anthu;, Sherry:

"Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed

from Eugene," by Hans A. Linde;

"Some Thoughts on University

Disciplinary Proceedings,' by

Ira Michael Heyman; "Reflec-

tions on the Academic Senate

Resolution," by Robert M. O'Neil;

"Responding to the December

8th Resolution: Of Politics, Free

Speech, and Due. Process,' by

David W. Louisell; "The Berke-

ley Crisis: Recollections, Over-

- view, and Response to Professor

Louisell,' by Frank C, Newman,

and a comment on "The Right

of Access by Nonstudents to Uni-

ACLU NEWS

JUNE, 1966

Pade 2

are current are being notified of

the meeting. If you have'nt re-

ceived a notice of the meeting

you may be on. the delinquent

list and should contact Mrs, Ruth

Lyon, 735 Curtis Street, Albany,

LA. 6-3349. She can also give

further details about the meeting

which is, of course, open to all

ACLUNC members,

ACLU Alcoholism

Case Supported

Continued from Page 1-

District of Columbia and for the

Fourth Circuit which accept the

ACLU position and states that

the California Supreme Court

was in error in not following

these decisions. Tne brief then

discusses the 8th Amendment's

prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishments and states that Budd

was convicted for conduct which

was an inevitable and unavoid-

able product of his disease and

therefore not punishable under a

state's criminal law. ;

versity Property,' by David B.

Frohnmayer,

Michael E. Tigar, Editor-in-

Chief of the Law Review wrote

the Introduction to the Sympo-

sium which also includes a four-

page bibliography.

The California Law Review

may be purchased directly from

the School of Law, University of

California, Berkeley (price:

$2.50).

BERKELEY-ALBANY Chapter ACLUNC booth at the Freedom Festival, April 30-May 1, held at Berkeley High

Scheol and sponsored by the Inter-Group Education Project of the Berkeley Public Schools. Mrs. Charles Richardson

is seated at the table.

For 9 Chapters

The Board of Directors of the ACLUNC last month adopted

a proposal to extend "direct representation" on the branch

board to the nine ACLU chapters. The effect would be to

increase the present size of the board from 30 to 39 members

and even more as new chapters are added, At the present

time the office is being urged to

establish chapters in Fresno and

Sonoma counties.

The Vete

The motion for chapter rep-

resentation was adopted by a

vote of 11 to 4, with 4 members

not voting, The complete text of

the motion is as follows: That the

ACLU Board of Directors:

(1) Adopt the principle of di-

rect representation on the

Branch Board chosen by each

Chapter;

(2) That it move immediately

to implement this policy on an

interim basis of one year by au-

thorizing each Chapter to elect

a representative under proce-

dures to be developed by the

Chapter Committee and approved

by the Board;

(3) That during the one year

interim period the Chapter Com-

mittee be charged with the re-

sponsibility of studying thorough-

ly and making recommendations

with respect to the changes in

Branch character and structure

to which this new policy inevi-

tably leads; and that therefore

(4) The Board of Directors

clearly commit itself to full re-

consideration of this issue at the

end of the one year interim pe-

riod; and that

(5) Fhe Board arrange for the

development of By-Laws amend-

ments which will make possible

the implementation of this mo-

tion. (This refers to section 2 of

the motion.)

At the present time, the nine

chapter areas include about 50%

of the branch membership. Of

course, the active membership in

such areas is rather small.

Strength of Chapters

Last September 1, from the

standpoint of supporters (mem-

bers and subscribers to the

NEWS), the strength of the

chapters was follows:

Berkeley-Albany . ................--..1308

Mid-Peninsula ._.........ccccceccoeeee 578

Marin County. ....../2...000..:........ 484

Sacramento Valley ................ 411

Santa Clara Valley ................ 251

Mt Diablo = = 231

Santa Cruz County ..WW000.000.... 123

Monterey County ......0.00.000.... 100

Stockton 3) 2 ee 79

Fresno and Sonoma county each

presently have 120 supporters.

- Under chapter By-Laws, 20

members or 10% of the member-

ship, which ever is larger, con-

stitutes a quorum for chapter

membership meetings.

Members wishing to express

their views about chapter repre-

sentation should address their

communications to the Board of

Directors ACLUNC, 503 Market

St., San Francisco, Calif. 94104.

Fresno Members

Vote To Organize

A Chapter

Ninety-two ACLUNC members

in the Fresno area met at a din-.

ner meeting in Fresno on May

19 and voted to organize a Fres-

no county chapter of ACLUNC.

The meeting was organized by

Russell K. Grove and chaired by

William Dienstein, Fresno Su-

perior Court Judge Leonard

Meyer addressed the group. Mrs.

Marcia Lang, branch Chapter Di-

rector, represented the branch.

An organizing committee is

now determining geographical

limits for the proposed chapter,

spelling out a program, provid-

ing for the appointment of com-

mittees, including a legal com-

mittee, and providing for the

writing of By-Laws. Any petition

for a charter must, of course, be

_ approved by the branch board of

directors. Once that approval is

secured, the membership would

be called together for the pur-

pose of electing a board of direc-

tors. Any member of the ACLU-

NC in the Fresno area may par-

ticipate in the proposed chapter

activities. Interested persons

should get in touch with Russell

K. Grove, 475 N. Blackstone,

Fresno.

Telephone

Case in

Supreme Court

The long battle to overturn a

Public Utilities Commission de-

cision that any telephone user

may be deprived of his service

without notice or hearing or op-

portunity to present a defense

whenever the police department

or an officer thereof informs the

company that the telephone is

being used "to aid and abet an

illegal purpose" came closer to

its conclusion last month when

the California Supreme Court (c)

agreed to hear the ACLU-spon-

sored case of Sokol v. Public Util-

ities Commission. The Supreme

Court granted a writ of review

bringing before it the latest de-

cision of the Public Utilities

Commission that it would not re-

verse its 1948 ruling that not

only could a telephone be re-

moved under the circumstances

above described, but that even if

the removal was the result of a

mistake and caused great damage

to the telephone user, the latter

could not obtain any redress

from the telephone company.

This will be the second time

the Sokol case has been in the

California Supreme Court in its

44-year history. On the first oc-

casion the court held that Sokol

must seek a change in the 1948

PUC decision before suing for

damages. It is the refusal of the

PUC to make this change that

again brings the case before the

California Supreme Court. Mean-

while Sokol's damage action is

still pending in Superior: Court

and will go to trial only if the

Supreme Court nullifies the PUC ~

ruling.

Sokol's request to have the

PUC rule reviewed was opposed

not only by the Public Utilities

Commission but by the Pacific

Telephone and Tclegraph Com-

pany and the Attorney General of

California. The Attorney General

takes the position that it is nec-

essary that the removal power be

exercised without notice or hear-

ing and without liability for dam-

ages in the event of error be-

cause only by this procedure may

bockmaking be controlled. The

ACLU takes the position that

even if the present practice is a

useful tool in fighting bookmak-

ing this is no excuse for violating

the Constitution. It is clear that

the present procedure allows the

taking of property without due

process of law and without ade-

quate compensation, a basic vio-

lation of the 14th Amendment.

ACLU attorneys on the case are .-

Marshall W. Krause and Leo Bor-

regard. :

Following is the greater part of the prevailing opinion of the State

Supreme Court in Mulkey vs. Reitman, decided May 10, 1966, holding

Proposition 14 as denying equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by

the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Mimeographed

copies of the entire opinion are available from: the ACLU office at 50

cents per copy.

Plaintiffs' complaint sets forth

that they are husband and wife,

citizens of the United States and

residents of the County of

Orange; that they are Negroes;

that defendants are the owners

and managers of a certain apart-

ment building in Orange County;

that in" May 1963 at least one

apartment therein was wunoc-

cupied and was being offered by

defendants for rent to the gen-

eral public; that plaintiffs of-

fered to rent any one of avail-

able apartments and were willing

and able to do so; that defend- -

ants refused to rent any of the

available apartments to plaintiffs

solely on the ground that plain-

tiffs were Negroes; that because

of such refusal plaintiffs were

unable to rent a suitable place to

live; that they suffered humilia-

tion and disappointment and en-

dured mental pain and suffering;

that defendants will continue to

refuse to rent to plaintiffs and

other members of their race sole-

ly on the ground of such race

unless restrained by order of the

`court; that plaintiffs have no

adequate remedy at law because

the discrimination practiced by

defendants is also practiced by.

other real estate brokers, and

home and apartment landlords

and owners in Orange County.

The motion for judgment was

made and granted solely on the

ground, as stated by the trial

court, "that the passage of Pro-

position 14 has rendered Civil

Code Sections 51 and 52 upon

which this action is based null

and void." The reference is to

the initiative measure: which ap-

. peared as Proposition 14 upon

the statewide ballot in the gen-

eral election of 1964, Following

its approval by the voters it was

incorporated into the California

Constitution as article I, section

26,

Plaintiffs unsuccessfully op-

posed the motion on the ground

that article I, section 26, is void

for constitutional reasons under

oth the state and federal Con-

stitutions; This contention pre-

sents the sole question on appeal.

Proposition 14, as now incor-

porated into the California Con-

stitution, provides in part as

follows:

Neither the State nor any

subdivision or agency thereof

shall deny, limit or abridge,

directly or indirectly, the right

of any person, who is willing

or desires to sell, lease or rent

any part or all of his real

property, to decline to sell,

lease or rent such property to

such person or persons as he,

in his absolute discretion,

chooses.

Our resolution of the question

of constitutionality is confined.

solely to federal constitutional

considerations, We note prelimi-

narily that although we are ex-

amining a provision which, by

its enactment by ballot, has been

accorded state constitutional

stature, the supremacy clause of

the United States Constitution

nevertheless compels that section

26, like any other state law, con-

form to federal constitutional

standards before it may be en-

forced against persons who are

entitled to protection under that

Constitution,

In 1959, the State Legislature

took the first major steps toward

eliminating racial discrimination

in housing. The Unruh Civil

Rights Act (Civ.-Code, secs. 51-

52) prohibited discrimination on

grounds of "race, color, religion,

ancestry, or natural origin" by

"business establishments of every

kind." On its face, this measure

encompassed the activities of

real estate brokers and all busi-

nesses selling or leasing residen-

tial housing. (See Lee v. O'Hara

(1962) 57 Cal.2d 476; Burks v.

Poppy Construction Co, (1962) 57

Cal.2d 463.) :

At the same session the Legis-

lature passed the Hawkins Act

(formerly Health and Saf. Code,

secs. 35700-35741) that prohibited

racial discrimination in publicly

assisted housing accommodations.

In 1961 the Legislature broad-

ened its attempt to discourage

segregated housing by enacting

proscriptions against discrimina-

tory restrictive convenants affect-

ing real property interests (Civ.

Code, sec, 53) and racially re-

strictive conditions in deeds of

real property (Civ. Code, sec.

782).

Finally in 1963 the State Legis-

lature superseded the Hawkins

Act by passing the Rumford Fair

Housing Act. (Health and Saf.

Code, secs. 35700-35744.) The

Rumford Act provided that "The

practice of discrimination be-

cause of race, color, religion, na-

tional origin, or ancestry is de-

clared to be against public

policy" and prohibited such dis-

crimination in the sale or rental

of any private dwelling contain-

ing more than four units. The

State Fair Employment Practice

Commission was empowered to

prevent violations.

Proposition 14 was enacted

against the foregoing historical

background with the clear intent

to overturn state laws that bore

on the right of private sellers and

lessors to discriminate, and to

forestall future state action that

might circumscribe this right. In

short, Proposition 14 generally

nullifies both the Rumford: and

Unruh Acts as they apply to the

housing market.

Plaintiffs' basic contention is

that the foregoing provision can-

not constitutionally withstand the

mandate contained in section 1

of the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution

that no state shall "deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws."

Thus, the constitutional proscrip-

tion invoked is twofold. First,

it is a limitation on State,

as distinguished from private ac-

tion and, second, it directs that

such state action, where under-

taken, meet certain minimum

standards. If we assume for the

moment that the state has under-

taken to act in these circum-

stances, then the pertinent issue

becomes whether such action ac-

cords equal protection of the

laws to plaintiffs. We consider

such issue initially.

It is now beyond dispute that

the Fourteenth Amendment,

through the: equal protection

clause, secures, without discrimi-

nation on account.of color, race

(or) religion, " `the right to ac-

quire and possess property of

every kind' ...' In Shelley v.

Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, the court

expressed itself as follows at

page 10: "... among the civil

rights intended to be protected

from discriminatory state action

by the Fourteenth Amendment

are the rights to acquire, enjoy,

own and dispose of property.

Equality in the enjoyment of

property rights was regarded by

the framers of that Amendment

`as an essential pre-condition to

the realization of other basic civil

rights and liberties which the

Amendment was intended to

guarantee."

The question of the fact of

discrimination, by whatever

hand, should give us little pause.

The very nature of the instant

action and the specific conten-

tions urged by the defendants

must be deemed to constitute

concessions on their part that

article I, section 26, provides for

/

nothing more than a purported

constitutional right to privately

discriminate on grounds which

admittedly would be unavailable

under the Fourteenth Amend-

ment should state action be in-

volved. Thus, as a complete and

only answer to plaintiffs' allega-

tions which irrefutably establish

a discriminatory act, defendants

urge that section 26 accords them

the right as private citizens to so

discriminate. The only real ques- .

tion thus remaining is whether

the discrimination results solely

from the claimed private action

or instead results at least in part

from state action which is suffi-

ciently involved to bring the

matter within the proscription of

the Fourteenth Amendment, For

the reasons stated below we have

concluded that state action is

sufficiently involved to fall with-

in the reach of the constitutional

prohibition,

_ It is only where the state is

significantly involved that the

prohibitions of the equal protec-

tion clause are invoked. The Su-

preme Court in Burton v. Wilm-

ington Parking Authority (1961)

365 U.S, 715, stated the proposi-

tion in the following language

at page 722: ". . . private conduct

abridging individual rights does

no violence to the Equal Protec-

tion Clause unless to some signif-

ieant extent the State in any

of its manifestations has been

found to have been involved in

it." That proscribed state involve-

ment is not to be limited to

direct conduct on the part of its

employees, agents and repre-

sentatives is made apparent by

the court's further statement at

page 722: "Only by sifting facts

and weighing circumstances can

the nonobvious involvement of

the State in private conduct be

attributed its true significance."

More recently the Supreme Court

has stated: "Conduct that is for-

mally `private' may become _so

entwined with governmental

policies or so impregnated with

a governmental character as to

become subject to the constitu-

tional limitations placed upon

state action." (Evans v. Newton

(1966) 382 U.S, --.)

However subtle may be the

state conduct which is deemed

"significant," it must neverthe-

less constitute action rather than

inaction. The equal protection

clause and, in fact, the whole of

the Fourteenth Amendment, is

prohibitory in nature and we are

not prepared to hold, as has been

urged, that it has been or should

be construed to impose upon the

state an obligation to take posi-

tive action in an area where it

is not otherwise committed to

act. Urged in support of such

proposition is James v. Marinship

Corporation, 25 Cal.2d 721, But

the prior state commitment in

that case is clear. We held that

a so-called private labor union

could not racially discriminate

against those who wished to be-

come members, but we first con-

cluded that the union, because it

had obtained a monopoly on the

labor supply, was like a public

service business which, under the

law of the state, was precluded

- from discriminating on the basis

of race. Likewise, in Jackson v..

Pasadena City School Dist.,

supra, 59 Cal.2d 876, the state

because it had undertaken

through school districts to pro-

vide educational facilities to the

youth of the state, was required

to do so in a manner which

avoided segregation and unrea-

sonable racial imbalance in its

schools,

The problem thus becomes one

of ascertaining positive state ac-

tion of a degree sufficient to be

deemed significant in the accom-

plishment of the recognized and

admitted discrimination.

In the broad sense, state action

has been consistently found

where the state, in any meaning-

ful way, has lent its processes to

the achievement of discrimina-

tion even though that goal was

not within the state's purpose.

Thus, state conduct has been

found in the action of a trial

court in enforcing a privately

ereated restrictive covenant

which prevented a sale of real

property to a Negro buyer. (Shel-

ley v. Kraemer, supra, 334 U.S. 1.)

In applying the Shelley reason-

ing that the processes of the

court cannot be utilized to ac-

complish a private discrimination

it. has been held reversible error

to exclude evidence that the

plaintiff landlord in an eviction

proceeding was motivated purely

by racial considerations, although

the defendant tenant was ad-

mittedly in default. (Abstract In-

vestment Co. v. Hutchinson, 204

Cal. App. 2d 242.)

Shelley, and the cases which

follow it, stand for the proposi-

_tion that when one who seeks to

discriminate solicits and obtains

the aid of the court in the ac-

complishment of that discrimina-

tion, significant state action,

within the proscription of the

protection clause, is involved.

The instant case may be dis-

tinguished from the Shelley and

Abstract cases only in that those

who would discriminate here are

not seeking the aid of the court

to that end. Instead they are in

court only because they have

been summoned there by those

against whom they seek to dis-

criminate. The court is not ask-

ed to enforce a convenant nor to

eject a tenant, but only to render

judgment denying the relief

sought in accordance with the

law of the state. Thus, it is con-

tended by defendants that the

isolated act of rendering such a

judgment does not significantly

involve the state in the prior act

of discrimination.

It must be recognized that the

application of Shelley is not lim-

ited to state involvement only

through court proceedings. In

the broader sense the prohibition

extends to any racially discrimi-

natory act accomplished through

the significant aid of any state

ageney, even where the actor is

a private citizen motivated by

purely personal interests. Thus,

in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 USS.

501, an entire town was owned by

a purely private company, the

agents of which caused the ar-

rest for trespass of persons en-

gaged in exercising their con-

stitutional freedom of speech. Al-

though no governmental] officials

or agents were involved, the Su-

preme Court found sufficient

_ state action to invoke the Four-

teenth Amendment. This was

based on the view that the com-

pany managers were performing

a governmental function of man-

aging and controlling a town

-wherin persons resided who were

entitled to Fourteenth Amend-

ment protections: " ... In our

view the circumstance that the

property rights to the premises

where the deprivation of liberty,

here involved, took place, where

held by others than the public,

is not sufficient to justify the

State's permitting a corporation

to govern a community of citizens

so as to restrict their fundamen-

tal liberties ... ." (Marsh v. Ala-

bama, supra, at p, 509.) There,

as contended by defendants in

the instant case, the state did

not participate except to condone

private action. :

Even more applicable in the in-

stant. circumstances are the so-

called `white primary cases."

In those cases private action

infringing the right to vote was

held to be the equivalent of state

action where accomplished with

the culpable permission of the

state. In Nixon v. Condon, for

instance, a state statute which

forbade voting by Negroes in

primaries was declared to be un-

constitutional. It was thereupon

repealed and a substitute meas-

ure enacted which was wholly

permissive, that is, political par-

ties were allowed to prescribe

the qualifications for member-

ship and voting rights in the

party's primaries, A local politi-

eal party thereafter barred Ne-

groes from voting in its primar-

ies and it was held that the per-

missive private action was

chargeable as state action.

A similar abdication of a tra-

ditional governmental function

for the obvious purpose of con-

doning its performance under

color of private action has re-

cently been struck down by the

Supreme Court in Evans v. New-

ton, supra, 382 U.S. There, a park

for the enjoyment of white per-

sons was owned, managed and

maintained by the City of Ma-

con, Georgia, as trustee under

the 1911, will of Senator August

Bacon. When a question was

raised whether the city could

continue to maintain the segre-

gated park consistent with the

Equal Protection Clause, it pur-

ported to transfer the park to

private trustees with the intent

that it would continue to be

maintained for the enjoyment of

white persons only. The fore

going conduct on the part of the

municipality was held to be pro-

scribed by the Fourteenth

Amendment, . `

It is contended by defendants,

however, that the foregoing,

eases, in the main, involved some

recognized governmental func-

tion which, although undertaken

by private persons, nevertheless

was required to be performed in

the same non-discriminatory man-

ner as would be required in the

case of performance by the state.

Such contention fails to recog-

`nize the basic issue' involved.

Those cases are concerned not

so much with the nature of the

function involved as they are

with who is responsible for con--

duct in performance of that func-

tion. If the function is tradition-

ally governmental in nature un-

questionably the state is respon-

sible. But this cannot be the only

instance wherein the state as-

sumes responsibility-it is also

responsible when, as we have

stated, it becomes significantly

involved in any discriminatory

conduct. !

Going to the question of what

constitutes significant involve-

ment,.it is established that even

where the state can be charged

with only encouraging discrimi-

natory conduct, the color of

state action nevertheless attach-

es, Justice Black, in writing for

the majority in Robinson v. Flori-

da, 378 U.S. 153, 156, and for the

dissenters in Bell v. Maryland,

378 U.S.. 226, 334, asserted that

private racial discrimination vio-

lated the Fourteenth Amend- (c)

ment once the state in any way

discourages integration or insti-

gates or encourages segregation.

In Burrows v. Jackson, supra, 346

U.S, 249, in holding that a racial-

ly restrictive convenant could

not constitutionally support a

suit for damages, the court ex-

plained at page 254: "The re-

sult of that sanction by the state

would be to encourage the use

of restrictive convenants, To that

extent, the State would act- to

put its sanction behind the co-

venants. If the State may thus

punish respondent for her fail-

ure to carry out her covenant,

she is coerced to continue to use (c)

her property in a discriminatory

manner, which in essence is the

purpose of the covenant. Thus,

it becomes not respondent's vol-

untary choice but the State's

choice that she observe her cov-

enant or suffer damages."

Proscribed governmental en-

couragement of private discrimi-

nation has not been confined to

the courts. Anderson v. Martin,

-Continued on Page 4

ACLU NEWS

JUNE, 1966

Page 3

A division of the State District Court of Appeal sitting in

San Francisco has handed down a startling opinion concern-

ing the rights of government employees who have been fired

for arbitrary or unconstitutional reasons. The court in the

ease of Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District held

that so long as a person has no

statutory protection against arbi-

trary termination of his govern-

ment employment he could be

dismissed for any reason what-

soever "even if such cause was as

alleged an unreasonable infringe-

ment of the employee's constitu-

tional rights."

Recall Committee

Nellie Bagley was an employee

of the Hospital District who was

summarily fired after she refused

an order to resign from a com-

mittee working for the recall of

some of the directors of the Dis-

trict. The District admitted that

this was the reason she was fired

but the courts upheld the firing

on the basis that she could be

fired for any reason whatsoever.

Hearing Granted

Fortunately, the Bagley opinion

will not become the law, because

last month the Supreme Court of

California granted a hearing in

the case which means that the

opinion of the District Court of

Appeal is vacated and the Su-

preme Court will write its own

opinion in the case. The hearing

was granted at the urging of Miss

Bagley's attorney, Victor Van

Bourg, and also at the urging of

the American Civil Liberties

Union of Northern California

which filed an amicus curiae

brief in support of the petition

for hearing. The friend of the

eourt brief states: "The District

Court of Appeal failed to recog-

nize that intimately involved in

this case is the doctrine that gov-

ernmental benefits may not be

conditioned on the surrender of

eonstitutional rights. Amicus

most strongly and respectfully

urges that a hearing be granted

so that government employees

may be protected from the harsh

and arbitrary ruling below that,

absent statutory or regulatory

protection, a government agency

may terminate employment for

any reason whatsoever including

punishment of the exercise of

eonstitutional rights of speech

and association unrelated to job

performance." The brief contin-

ues, "If constitutional rights may

be so effortlessly stifled, if their

exercise may be so easily threat-

ened and inhibited, then our

proud claim to a government of

limited powers is empty of mean-

ing. Amicus believes that the

rights asserted by plaintiff in

this case were beyond the reach

of governmental punishment or

inhibition and that the assertion

of power to the contrary must

. fail." :

Power of Government

The ACLU takes the position

that merely because a person is

a. temporary or a provisional em-

ployee does not mean that he can

be forced to give up his consti-

tutional rights or lose his govern-

ment employment. "Constitu-

tional freedoms are the heritage

of all Americans and are not

waived by a public employee just

because he can be fired without

`eause.' No agent of the govern-

ment can terminate a beneficial

relationship of an American with

his government simply because

that American happens to be a

Negro, or a Catholic, or a mem-

ber of a recall committee. The

proper focus in this case is on

the power of the government

agency and not on the status of

the employee.' The brief con-

cludes: "If non-permanent gov-

ACLU NEWS

Page 4 JUNE, 1966

ernment employees may be dis-

missed for the exercise of con-

stitutional rights, then these per-

sons will be forced into a pattern

of timidity having a serious in-

hibiting effect on First Amend-

ment and other constitutional

freedoms." The amicus brief in

the Bagley case was prepared by

ACLU staff counsel Marshall W.

Krause.

Another Case _

Since the Supreme Court has

agreed to take the Bagley case,

the ACLU has urged the Court

to bring up for its consideration

before decision of the District

Court of Appeal the similar case

of Gerald Rosenfield v. James

Malcolm involving a doctor who

was fired by the Alameda County

Health Director solely because

he refused to resign his member-

ship in the Ad Hoc Committee to

End Discrimination. In a letter

to the high court the ACLU

stated that the same principle

which will be determinative of

the Bagley case will also be de-

terminative of the Rosenfield

case and therefore the two ought

to be heard together. The Rosen-

field case is being handled by

the ACLU and has been fully

briefed with the assistance of

volunteer attorney James R. Mc-

Call. :

Berkeley Senate

Will Oppose

Loyalty Oath

The attack on California's loyal-

ty oath (commonly known as the

"Levering Act Oath') received

increased momentum when the

Academic Senate of UC's Berke-

ley campus voted on May 17th to

support the legal challenge to -

the oath's unconstitutionality in

an appropriate case. The Senate's

position will be made known in a

brief to be prepared by the Aca-

demic Freedom Committee of the

Senate and filed as a friend of

the court for the purpose of mak-

ing known the threat to academie

freedom created by the loyalty

oath which now must be sub-

scribed to by all government em-

ployees in California. The Sen-

ate's vote to make its position

known in court will undoubtedly

strengthen the case against. the

loyalty oath while at the same

time making it apparent that the

University community is increas-

ingly sensitive to questions of

freedom of expression and is

going to go to bat for its princi-

ples.

Membership

Campaign

Shows Progress

About 15% of the Union's

membership drop out each year

for one reason or another. Con-

sequently, in order to stand still

at last year's figure of 6659 mem-

bers, the ACLUNC needs 1000

new members during the fiscal

year.

Seven hundred new members

must be secured during the

spring membership campaign

which comes to an end on June

30. On May 23, the campaign had

netted 625 members, and the

paid membership was within 100

of the record of 6659 reached

last fall.

"Herblock' Stamp

For Bill of

Rights Day

Recognition of the 175th anni-

versary of the Bill of Rights is

starting early with the issuance

of a commemorative stamp by the

Post Office Department on July

1, A picture of the stamp appears

above.

It was designed by Herbert L.

Block who, under the name "Her-

block" draws editorial cartoons

for the Washington Post and for

syndication in newspapers. The

dominant feature of the shield-

shaped design are two hands in

conflict, On the right of the de-

sign is a gauntleted fist, sugges-

tive of "the knock on the door

at night" associated with tyranny.

This fist is opposed by a bare

upraised hand symbolizing the

guarantees of freedom in the

Bill of Rights; Running across

the design and between the op-

posing hands are the words: "The

rights of the people shall not be

violated."

While the birthday of the Bill

of Rights is December 15 the

stamps will be available on July

1. Collectors desiring first day

cancellations may send addressed

envelopes, together with remit-

tance to cover the cost of the

stamps to be affixed, to the Post-

master, Miami Beach, Florida

33139. The envelope to the Post-

master should be endorsed "First

Day Covers 5c Bill of Rights

Stamp." Orders must not include

requests for uncancelled stamps.

Requests must be postmarked no

later than July, 1966.

Will Establishes

"Defenders

of Liberty'

The will of Dallas Bedford

Lewis of Los Angeles, wealthy

manufacturer of Dr. Ross dog

and cat food, left $1 million to

the John Birch Society, another

million to former FBI Agent Dan

Smoot, TV commentator, still

another million to Pepperdine

College in Los Angeles if it

would award a doctorate to

Smoot, and $1.5 million to found

the "Defenders of Liberty."

"This organization,' said the

will, "shall be the counterpart

of the American Civil Liberties

Union except that (it) ... shall

be exclusively devoted to the de-

be exclusively devoted to the de-

fense of American citizens who

believe and stand for the Consti-

tution of our United States in its

entirety as it stood up to and in-

cluding the year 1950."

The will stated that none of the

funds should be used to defend

"any individual who used the 5th

Amendment ... as part of his

defense, or who is an acknow-

ledged member of the Commu-

nist or Socialist party." -

Incidentally, Pepperdine Col-

lege has refused to award a doc-

torate to Smoot and will, there-

fore, lose the bequest.

tion,

Calif. Supreme Court

Proposition 14 Opinion

Continued from Page 3-

375 U.S, 399, involved racial fa-

beling of candidates on ballots.

Although the state practice did

not require discrimination on the

part of individual voters, it was

struck down because it encour-

aged and assisted in discrimina-

The Supreme Court has re-

cently spoken out against state

action which only authorizes ``pri-

vate" discrimination, In Burton

v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., supra,

365 U.S, 715, the court had be-

fore it the question of whether

the State of Delaware discriminat-

ed against a Negro who was ex-

cluded from a privately-operated

restaurant leased from a public

agency of that state. The court

stated at page 725 that the state

"not only made itself a party to

the refusal of service, but has

elected to place its power, prop-

erty and prestige behind the ad-

mitted discrimination. The State

has so far insinuated itself into

a position of interdependence ...

that it must be recognized as a

joint participant in the chal-

lenged activity ...." In a con-

curring opinion Justice Stewart,

concluding that the state enact-

ment involved, as construed by

_ the state court, authorized dis-

crimination, stated at page 727:

"T think, therefore, that the ap-

peal. was properly taken, and that

the statute, as authoritatively con-

strued by the Supreme Court of

Delaware, is constitutionally in-

valid." Even the dissenting jus-

tices agreed that if the state court

had construed the state enactment

as authorizing racial discrimina-

tion, there was a denial by the

state of equal protection of the

laws, Justice Frankfurter stating

at page 727: "For a State to place

its authority behind discrimina-

tory treatment based solely on

color is indubitably a denial by a

State of the equal protection of

the laws, in violation of the Four-

teenth Amendment."

-The instant case presents an

undeniably analogous situation

wherein the state, recognizing

that it could not perform a direct

act of `discrimination, neverthe-

less has taken affirmative action

of a legislative nature designed

to make possible private discrim-

inatory' practices which previ-

ously were legally restricted. We

cannot realistically conclude that,

because the final act of discrimi-

._ hation is undertaken by a pri-

vate party motivated only by per-

sonal economic or social con-

siderations, we must close our

eyes and ears to the events

which purport to make the final

act legally possible. Here the

state has affirmatively acted to

change its existing laws from a

situation wherein the discrimina-

tion practiced was legally re-

stricted to one wherein it is en-

couraged, within the meaning of

the cited decisions, Certainly the

act of which complaint is made

_is as much, if not more, the leg-

islative action which authorized

private discrimination as it is the

The first right of a citizen

Is the right _

To be responsible

final, private act of discrimina-

tion itself. Where the state can

be said to act, as it does of course

through the laws approved by

legislators elected by the popular

vote, it must also be held to act

through a law adopted directly

by the popular vote. When the

electorate assumes to exercise

the law-making function, then the

electorate is as much a state

agency as any of its elected of-

ficials. It is thus apparent that,

while state action may take many

- forms, the test is not the novelty

of the form but rather the ulti-

mate result which is achieved

through the aid of state process-

es, And if discrimination is thus

accomplished, the nature of pro-

scribed state action must not be

limited by the ingenuity of those

who would seek to conceal it by

subtleties and claims of neutrali-

ty.

Contrary to defendants' claims,

the state's abstinence from mak-

ing the decision to discriminate

in a particular instance does not

conier upon it the status of neu-

trality in these circumstances.

Justice Byron R. White's view of

the facts in Evans v, Newton,

supra, 382 U.S.-, poses an al-

most identical issue to that. here

presented, In his view the ma-

jority in Evans were not justified

on the record in concluding that

the City of Macon was continuing

to operate and maintain the park

there involved after transfer to

private trustees, and he grounded

his conclusion of proscribed state

action on 1905 legislation. which

did not compel but would never-

theless make it possible for the

maintenance of segregated pri-

vate parks for either white or

colored persons.

From the foregoing it is ap-

parent that the state is at least a

partner in the instant act of dis-

crimination and that its conduct

is not beyond the reach of the

Fourteenth Amendment,

Article I, section 26 of the

California Constitution thus de-

nied to plaintiffs and all those

similarly situated the equal pro-

tection of the laws as guaranteed

by the Fourteenth Amendment to

the federal Constitution, and is

void in its general application,

The judgment is reversed.

Marin Meeting "

Discusses C.0O.

Draft Problems -

Marin ACLU sponsored a pub-

lic meeting titled "You and the

Draft" Saturday morning April

30. Purpose of the meeting was to

acquaint young men and women

with the laws and procedures

governing the draft and conscien-

tious objection. Speakers were

Ben Seaver, American Friends

Service Committee; Lloyd Mc-

Murray, San Francisco attorney;

and Alex Slivka, resident coun-

selor for the Central Committee

on Conscientious Objection,

aa

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