vol. 33, no. 12
Primary tabs
merican
Civil Liberties
~ Union
Volume XXXIII
SAN FRANCISCO, DECEMBER, 1968
No. 12
S.F. Presidio "Mutiny"
Appalling
Conditions at
Stockade
Private Richard Bunch, an inmate of the Presidio Stock-
ade with a long history of emotional turbulence, was shot
to death on October 11, 1968. Bunch was killed while al-
legedly attempting to escape. A note left behind by Bunch
suggested that his escape was feigned-a deliberate attempt
to draw lethal fire from a shot-
gun guard. The motive? To have
the army participate in his sui-
cide.
Prisoners Sit Down
Bunch's killing did nothing to
alleviate the fears and frustra-
tions of an already disgruntled
inmate population. On the Mon-
day following the Bunch killing
the inmates lined up in their
customary morning formation.
But when the first name of the
roll was called, twenty - seven
prisoners did something uncus-
tomary. They stepped from the
formation and walked to a grassy
area where they sat down and
began singing "freedom" songs.
Singing and Chanting
For the next hour they con-
tinued their singing and chant-
ing, augmenting it occasionally
by lifting their hands to reveal
fingers raised to form a "V."
They also called out names of
persons they wanted to see. They
chanted "We want Hallinan," (a
yeferente io San Francisco at-
torney Terrence Hallinan), `we
want the press" and "we want
Lamont," the latter a reference
to Captain Robert Lamont, Com-
mandant of the Presidio.
Grievances
Their last wish was the only
one to come true, Captain La-
mont arrived about half-way
through the demonstration.
When Lamont appeared one of
the prisoners arose and attempt-
ed to read a list of grievances
that the prisoners wanted recti-
fied. They included requests
that guards at the Stockade be
rotated more frequently; guards
be given psychiatric examina-
tions; racial discrimination end
at the Stockade; the over-crowd-
ed conditions be eliminated; the
sanitary facilities in the Stock-
ade be improved; shot-gun work
details be abolished and that
there be a thorough investigation
of the Bunch killing.
Mutiny Act Read
Lamont refused to listen to
the grievances and instead, ac-
cording to him, read to the pri-
soners from Article 94 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Article 94 is the "Mutiny Act."
The prisoners continued their
singing and chanting while La-
mont read and it was apparent
to him that he could not be
heard. He then addressed the
prisoners over a_ loudspeaker,
read the Mutiny Act again and
ordered the prisoners to return
to the Stockade barracks. The
prisoners maintain that they did
not hear the Mutiny Act and
that they did not hear the order
given by Lamont. There is no
dispute that the prisoners did
not return to the Stockade build-
ing until escorted there by the
Military Police.
Capital Offense
The result of the demonstra-
tion is that 27 Stockade prisoners
have been charged with a capital
offense, mutiny, because, accord-
ing to the complaint, they "act-
ing jointly and in pursuance of
the common intent, with intent
to override lawful military au-
thority, did, at the Fresidio of
San Francisco, California, on or
about 14 October 1968, refuse in
concert to obey the orders of
Captain Robert S. Lamont to
enter the Stockade .. ."
Pre-Trial Hearing
. The incident of October 14 and
the events that led up to it were
the focus of a military pre-trail
hearing that lasted for over a
week. ACLUNC staff counsel]
Paul Halvonik participated in
that hearing as attorney for
Nesrey Sood, one of the accused.
ACLUNC is participating in the
defense of the "mutineers" be-
cause of a continuing concern
over conditions in the Stockade,
because the severity of the
charge strongly suggests that the
Army is attempting to stifle free-
dom of expression and because
the charge itself, disobeying an
order "with the intent to over-
ride military authority" is a
yaguc and wholly `msypropriste
charge.
The week-long hearing con-
cerned 17 of the 27 accused. The
prisoners, other than Sood, wers
represented by San Francisco
attorneys Terrence Hallinan,
Howard Anawalt, Howard Engel-
skirschen and military counsel:
Captains Tom Fay, Emmett
Yeary and Joe Choate.
No testimony was put on by
the defense at these hearings.
The testimony of the Stockade
personnel, however, established
that the conditions in the stock-
ade have been insufferable and
that the grievances the demon-
strators attempted to bring to
the attention of the army were
well founded. The army's testi-
mony showed that:
Filthy and Overcrowded
For the 56 days preceding the
demonstration the Stockade had
been so overcrowded that it was,
under army regulations, in
"emergency" status. Those same
army regulations require that
an emergency status exist for no
longer than seven days. In the
weeks preceding the demonstra-
tion the Stockade inmates were
receiving insufficient food. Testi-
mony varied on the precise num-
ber of rations being drawn and
the precise number of prisoners
incarcerated during that period
but it is clear that rations for
less than one hundred men were
distributed among a population
of over 120 men, The sanitary
conditions were unspeakable.
There are an insufficient number
of latrines in the Stockade and
those that exist are often un-
usable. One guard testified that
the latrines became so stopped-
up that he observed human ex:
crement floating in the showers.
Guards Poorly Screened
' The screening of the Stockade
guards was also revealed to be
less than adequate. There is, ac-
cording to the testimony of a
guard supervisor, a guard on
duty at the Stockade who treats
black prisoners in a racially dis-
-Continued on Page 2
- composed of Harper,
25 Long-Haired
P.O. Employees
May Be Fired
The San Francisco Post Office
is turning down long-haired and
shaggy bearded applicants for
employment. Under recent de-
partmental regulations an em-
ployee must "be neat and clean
in his appearance and _ habits.
Hair-and beards and mustaches,
if worn-must be kept neatly
-trimmed and clean."
Bruce Overton, 19, was re-
cently accepted for a postal job
at the San Francisco Airport and
then turned down because of his
long hair. He was instructed to
have it cut, but when he reap-
peared with his hair above the
collar Mr. Yarberry informed
him that his hair had to con-
form to styles worn by police-
men. (The San Francisco police
department has no regulation on
the subject, according to the
local press). On the other hand,
Charles W. Harper, director of
management and procedures for
Postmaster Lim P, Lee was
quoted in the press as saying
that he had no objections to long
hair "as long as it isn't too long
. say, above the collar and
neatly trimmed." That's the way
Overton appeared but he was
turned down anyway and chose
to return to his home in southern
California,
Some 25 employees at the San
Francisco Post Office who pres-
ently have long hair and/or
beards are threatened with dis-
ciplinary action unless they cut
their hair and beards. Postal
station superintendents must de-
termine "if the employee's hair,
vearad ad musiache are meatiy
trimmed." From there an ap-
peal lies to the superintendent
of city delivery and finally to
the Appearance Review Board
Charles
O'Donnell, director of operations,
and Joseph Palanshek, director
of installations.
At this point, the Post Office
has merely made threatening
noises. No case has gone to the
Appearance Review Board.
Civil Disobedience
Disappointing Decision
lig
Court Upholds
Death Penalty
The 4-3 decision of the State Supreme Court upholding
the death penaliy as administered in California was a great
disappointment. Expectations of a favorable result grew as
the months passed. The suit was filed in the State Supreme
Court on October 12, 1967; the decision was rendered on
November 18, 1968.
There are, however, some con-
solations. Because of the suit no
executions occurred during the
period when the matter was be-_
fore the Supreme Court and the
death penalties of Anderson aN
Saterfield were reversed. They
were reversed on the ground that
the juries. which imposed the sen-
tences of death were "hanging
juries" from which all persons
opposed to the death penalty had
been excluded. The U.S. Supreme
Court recently held, in Wither.
spoon v. Illinois, that hanging
juries are constitutionally im-
permissable, a decision that did
not occur until long after
ACLUNC and the Legal Defense
Fund had intervened on behalf
of Anderson and Saterfield; if
we had not intervened they would
probably have been executed be-
Sonoma County
Council Granted
Chapter Status
The Sonoma County Council,
created in the Fall of 1966, was
granted Chapter status by unani-
mous vote of the Branch Board
of Directors on November 14th.
The new Chapter has a mem-
bership of 200, and a strong pool
of active werkeors, Four public
meetings have been held by the
Council, notably the September
`meeting featuring Dr. Spock at
which the community was ap-
praised of the state of Civil Lib-
erties and the Draft, and funds
were raised.
Now that Sonoma has been
granted Chapter status, there are
eleven Chapters of the American
Civil Liberties Union of North-
ern California.
ACLU Prevails in Teaching
Credentials Cases
The Credentials Committee of the California State Board
of Education is re-examining the credentials of all teachers
and applicants for teaching credentials arrested in connec-
tion with political demonstrations. Six of the teachers have
recently sought help from ACLUNC; more are expected.
Three cases were successfully
concluded last month. Martin
Ponch and Paul Obluda of San
Francisco, both active in the War
Resisters League, appeared at in-
forma] hearings on November 18
and 19 and persuaded the Com-
mittee on Credentials to drop
further proceedings against their
credentials. Mrs. Toby Hendon,
whose application for a creden-
tial has been delayed, was told
after a hearing that her creden-
tial would be granted.
Induction Center Arrests
- All three had been arrested
during demonstrations outside
the Oakland Induction Center.
The three were represented at
the hearings by. ACLUNC assis-
tant staff counsel Charles Mar-
son.
Three similar cases will soon
be heard. They concern Genevi-
eve McDonald of South San
Francisco, Susan Roberts of Ber-
keley, and Alvin Wasserman of
San Anselmo. 0x00B0
At the hearings, the members
of the Credentials Committee ex-
pressed concern that one who
disobeys "authority" in the
streets by engaging in an act
of peaceful civil disobedience
might disobey school authorities
as well. The logic of this con-
cern was not discussed.
Moral Turpitude
In Hallinan v. Committee of
Bar Examiners (1966) 65 Cal.
2nd 447, the Committee of Bar
Examiners had refused to certify
Hallinan, who has been arrested
six times and convicted twice on
misdeameanor charges arising
out of "sit-ins". The court re-
versed the Committe and ordered
it to certify Hallinan as quali-
fied to practice law, stating:
"We do not believe that peti-
tioner's participation in the civil
disobedience here shown can be
characterized as involving moral
turpitude. If we were to deny
every person who has engaged in
a `sit-in' or other form of non-
violent civil disobedience, and
who has been convicted therefor,
the right to enter a licensed pro- -
fession, we would deprive the
community of the services of
many highly qualified persons of
the highest moral courage. This
should not be done."
fore Witherspoon was decided.
Additionally, the Court held
that in the future all condemned
men will be given court-appoint-
ed counsel to pursue their legal
claims up to the moment they
are executed or are released from
death row. We had advanced this
right to counsel as a constitution-
al right, the court adopted it as
a matter of "policy." When the
litigation began a condemned
man had no right to counsel after
his conviction was affirmed by
the State Supreme Court; during
the last session of the Legislature
a bill sponsored jointly by
ACLUNC and the Friends Com-
mittee on Legislation extended
the right to counsel to review in
the United States Supreme Court;
now a condemned man will also
have counsel for habeas corpus
proceedings in the state and
federal courts, for clemency hear-
ings and for sanity hearings,
Constitutional Issue
But we did lose on the most
significant issue: the constitution-
ality of the death penalty, Where
the litigation will continue has
not yet been decided. The United
States Supreme Court and the
Federal District Court are the
two fora now available. The
death penalty challenge began
as a Federal District Court suit;
it was returned to the State court
under' a Federal court order re-
quiring the petitioners to `"ex-
haust their state remedies."
Those remedies have been thor-
oughly exhausted and suit is still
pending in the Federal court.
One thing is clear: before anyone
is again executed in California -
the Federal courts will have to
decide whether California's
death penalty meets constitution-
al standards.
The lawyers for Anderson and
Saterfield are Paul Halvonik for
ACLUNC, Anthony G. Amster-
dam for NAACP/LDF and volun-
teer attorneys Jerome Falk, Gary
Berger, Roy Eisenhardt and Har-
ry Kraemer,
High Court
Hears Student
Armband Case
The U.S. Supreme Court last
month heard oral arguments in
the cases of three Des Moines,
Iowa, public school students who
were disciplined for wearing
black armbands to schoo] in De-
cember 1965 to express their
views about the Vietnam war.
They said they wore them to
mourn the dead and to support
a proposal to extend the Christ-
mas truce,
The case raises important free-
dom of expression issues for
public school children. If the
educational process is not inter- .
fered with and there are no dis-
ciplinary problems, may school
administrators limit the freedom
of students?
A couple of months ago the
court refused to hear a Dallas
case which challenged the right
of school officials to bar stu-
dents with long hair. In Cali-
fornia, the lower courts have
ruled against students in such
cases. In the Gregor Myers case
from Arcata, in which a student
was suspended for violating a
regulation prohibiting "extreme"
haircuts, a decision of the State
District Court of Appeal is being
awaited,
State College Project
Sacramentans
Oppose Bill of
Rights Petition
A large group of Sacramento State College freshmen
fanned out over Sacramento recently to seek endorsements
of a petition titled "Americans in Support of Civil Liberties."
The 130 students, members of an anthropology class, con-
tacted more than 7,500 persons from Capitol Park to Sierra
Oaks to Del Paso Heights to re-
quest signatures on the following
petition: :
The Petition
"We, the undersigned residents
of Sacramento County, believe
that all federal, state and local
officials should be required to
conform to each of the following
rules: cent
"1. The right to trial by jury.
"2. The right of the people to
freedom of the press, freedom
of speech, the right to peacefully
assemble and the right to peti-
tion.
"3. No person shall be tried
twice for the same offense, nor
compelled to testify against him-
self, nor be deprived of life or
liberty without due process of
law.
"4, An accused person has the
right to a speedy trial, to be in-
formed of the charges against
him and to have the assistance of
a lawyer in his defense.
"5. Excessive bail should not |
be required nor excessive fines
be imposed.
"6. No person shall be de-
prived of his rights on the basis
of his race, color or religion."
Two Out of Three Refuse
Of the 7,600 persons: contacted,
more than 5,000 refused to en-
dorse these principles. These in-
cluded a state legislator who
looked at No. 2 and said, "I'm
opposed to it. All it does is per-
mit riots and demonstrations."
Many balked and declined to
read further when they saw the
words "Civil Liberties" in bold
print in the petition title, appar-
ently suspicious of the term.
The six "rules" they seeming-
ly refused to go along with are,
of course shortened versions of
Articles 1, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the
U. S. Bill of Rights, plus a para-
phrase of the 14th Amendment to
the U. S. Constitution.
Objections
The reasons given for not sign-
ing the petition, the students re-
ported, included these:
"If you really want this kind
of thing, why don't you try to get
on the ballot?"
"Ym patriotic. I don't want
to get involved in this type of
thing."
"You should be in jail: your
whole organization should be
put in jail for distributing this
kind of material."
"T don't believe in that sort of
thing." !
Man in front of the police sta-
tion: "I'm not going to sign.
There are too many rights al-
ready."
"There's too much welfare al-
ready."
Communistic
Husband and wife, both school
teachers: "This is communistic
and anti-American. Are you being
paid to circulate this?
"Ym in the military. I can't
support this type of thing."
"Tf I sign this and my boss
sees it, I could get in trouble."
"T can't sign this. I'm a conser-
vative Republican."
"This sounds like John Birch
Society stuff."
"T ean't sign. I wouldn't make
a good hippie."
"Yd better not sign until my
husband has a chance to read
it
ACLU NEWS
DECEMBER, 1968
Page 2
Not Practical
Lobbyist at the Capitol: "I
couldn't sign. These things are
not practical. They won't work."
"Youwre crazy."
"Go to hell."
"T think it's too ambiguous."
"All this is just an excuse to
riot."
Negro woman in Del Paso
Heights: "I could sign, but I don't
want people throwing stones at
my house or burning it down."
Campaign Headquarters
Nobody at Nixon campaign
headquarters would sign. Wal-
lace headquarters hedged, then
called on the area chairman who
signed. Several signed at Hum-
phrey headquarters (somebody
there had prior knowledge of the
petition project).
The students who discussed
the project in class the other
day, said many non-signers, es-
pecially government workers and
professional people, indicated
they were hesitant for fear their
jobs, careers or positions in the
community could be affected by
signing what might be seen as
a "radical" petition.
Others were cool to the whole
idea, suspecting it might be the
work of a radical group with
whom they might become identi-
fied. ;
Some Enthusiasts
But there were some enthusi-
asts, including an elderly man
who put down a load of books,
put on his spectacles, read it
carefully and said, "I really be-
lieve in all this." Some recog-
nized the principles and signed;
others recommended neighbors
who could be expected to sign.
The project was directed by
Asst. Prof. Howard P. Goldfried
of the SSC Anthropology De-
partment, who concluded:
"This raises an extremely seri-
ous question: You can legitimate-
ly ask just how politically edu-
cated and politically aware the
voters are. Democracy can func-
tion only if you have an educated
electorate. This kind of thing
questions whether we have one."
-Column by Art McGinn, Look-
ing Around, Sacramento Bee,
November 15, 1968.
Berkeley
S.F. Presidio Unethical Practices
Charges Made
Against Asst.
U.S. Attorney
The ACLU last month charged the United States Attor-
ney's office and Asst. U.S. Attorney Jerrold Ladar with un-
ethical practices. The complaint involved the seizure by the
F.B.I. of the passport of a young lady, J.M., 26. The passport
was in the young lady's luggage which was stored in the
`Mutiny' Case
Continued from Page 1-
criminatory manner. Guards
have, without provocation and in
violation of army regulations,
pointed their weapons at prison-
ers. Guards have also indulged
in "horseplay" with firearms.
On one occasion a gun was dis-
charged during "horseplay" and
a hole was shot in the ceiling of
a building near the Stockade.
Suicide attempts have been oc-
curring at the Presidio at a rate
of about five per month. The
army dismisses these attempts as
mere "gestures." In one such
gesture a man slit his throat,
was taken to the hospital where
his wound required numerous
stitches and was returned that
same day to a Stockade isolation
cell. The isolation cell painted
black, contained no toilet, nor
was there any place to sit or lie
other than an iron grating placed
against the wall.
Tale of Violence
The level of compassion for
the inmates may be measured
by the actions of a guard super-
visor during the period between
_the Bunch killing and the de-
monstration.The chief topic of
conversation among the prisoners
was, quite naturally, the killing
of Bunch and the guard super-
visor took that opportunity to
tell the men that he, personally,
had killed a Vietnamese woman
by shooting her three times in
the stomach with a pistol. At
the hearing the guard supervisor
insisted that he had not in fact
shot a Vietnamese woman. He
could give no reason for telling
the prisoners that story at such
a critical time. .
ACLUNC has taken the posi-
tion that there was no mutiny at
the Stockade on October 14.
1968. The prisoners conducted a
peaceful and nonviolent demon-
stration to secure a hearing for
grievances that were substantial;
their demonstration was the only
manner in which they could peti-
tion for a redress of their griev-
ances. ACLUNC has suggested
that the Army drop its `charges
of mutiny and, instead, rectify
the Stockade conditions that led
to the demonstration.
crossed the thousand mark and,
after the first membership cam-
paign in 1952, the membership
jumped from 1855 to 3029.
Membership
Figures -
During the past ten years the
ACLU membership has climbed
from 4078 to 7629 on October
31, 1968.
Established in September 1934,
the branch membership grew
slowly. After ten years, it stood
at only 742. In 1946 it finally
`State of
Emergency' Cases Dismissed
ACLUNC's attack on the constitutionality of the Berkeley
ordinance which permits the City Manager to declare "states
of civil emergency" and the challenge to the constitutionality
of "regulations" adopted pursuant to that ordinance during
two separate occasions in Berkeley this past summer, con-
tinues to be thwarted by victory.
The promulgation of the first
state of emergency imposed a
curfew throughout the city of
Berkeley. The promulgation dur-
ing the second emergency pro-
hibited "loitering" and banned
all public meetings. When the
second "state of emergency" was
promulgated ACLUNC and its
Berkeley-Albany chapter brought
suit in the Federal District Court
to enjoin enforcement of the or-
dinance and the "regulations"
prohibiting loitering and bann-
ing public meetings. Before the
federal court suit could be heard,
however, the Berkeley City Coun-
cil, on recommendation of the
City Manager, rescinded the
"regulations."
The battle then shifted to the
Berkeley Municipal Court where
ACLU defended persons arrested
for violating the rules and regu-
`lations.
Both sides filed extensive
briefs on the constitutionality of
the ordinance and the regula-
tions. ACLU took the position
that they were all unconsitution-
al on their face. The Berkeley
city attorney took the position
that the ordinance and the rules
adopted pursuant to it should not
be read "on their face' but
should be interpreted to prohibit
only "loitering" and public meet-
ings that "endangered life or
property." The district attorney
took the position that if the
City's interpretation of the regu-
lations was adopted, no case
could be proved against the de-
fendants.
Berkeley Municipal Judge
-Continued on Page 4
basement of the Richmond home
of a couple whom she knew only
casually. The F.B.I. searched the
place for contraband and assert-
edly found explosives, but they
also searched the lady's posses-
sions and seized her passport.
When the lady sought her be-
longings and discovered that the
F.B.I, had seized her passport
she telephoned Agent Jones, 2118
Milvia St., Berkeley. He readily
admitted he was holding her
passport.
Intimidation
As the young lady put it, Mr.
Jones "came on very strong."
She teld him she was after her
passport, and he wanted to know
where she was. She told him
she'd like to pick up the pass-
port and that she'd be in on Fri-
day. "Oh, no," he responded,
"we're not going to wait until
Friday; you'll come in now!" She
protested that she was ill and
could not come in until Friday.
Then he wanted to know who her
doctor was because they would
have to check her asserted ill-
ness. "If you don't come before
Friday, we will come to get you,"
Jones is reported to have said.
"You have to clear yourself!"
The lady had no objection to
talking with Jones, but because
of her indisposition she wasn't
prepared to do so before Friday.
Because of his insistence, how-
ever, she contacted the ACLU.
ACLU Intervenes -
Ernest Besig telephoned Jones
and demanded that he return the
lady's passport because it was
seized illegally. Jones wanted to
know where the lady lived but he
was told this information would-
n't be given; that the passport.
could be returned through the
ACLU office.
Agreement Made
Later, Jones called Besig and
said that the passport was being
sent to the office of Asst. U. S.
Attorney Jerrold Ladar and that
he could telephone Mr. Ladar
about it. Besig did telephone La-
dar who stated his willingness to
return the passport if he could
serve a subpoena upon the lady
to testify before the Federal
Grand Jury. Besig said that was
agreeable with him and that he
would arrange for the lady's ap-'
pearance at the U. S, Attorney's
office. It was finally agreed to
meet at the U. S. Attorney's of-
fice in San Francisco at 10 a.m.
on Friday, November 8.
Residence Sought
The lady appeared with a
friend and Mr. Besig and Mr.
Ladar presented himself at the
counter with an F.B.I. agent
whom he introduced as Mr. Hen-
nesey, Mr, Ladar then asked the
lady where she lived. Besig in-
structed her not to answer the
question because it would lead to
more F.B.I, harassment. Ladar ~
then wanted to know whether
Besig was a member of the Cali- |
fornia bar, and he responded by
: saying that. it didn't make any
difference. He nevertheless in-
sisted and besig stated he was
a member of the New York bar.
-Continued on Page 4
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION NEWS
Published by the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California
Second Class Mail privileges authorized at San Francisco, California
ERNEST BESIG .. . Editor
503 Market Street, San Francisco, California 94105, 433-2750
Subcription Rates - Two Dollars and Fifty Cents a Year.
Twenty-Five Cents Per Copy
Ralph B. Atkinson
Albert M. Bendich
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Rey. Hamilton Boswell
Price M. Cobbs, M.D.
Prof, John Edwards
Robert Greensfelder
Rey, Aron S. Gilmartin
Evelio Grillo
Mrs. Zora Cheever Gross
Francis Heisler
Neil F. Horton
Howard H. Jewel
Gerald D. Marcus
Ephraim Margolin
Honorary Treasurer:
Joseph $. Thompson
Honorary Board Member:
Sara Bard Field
Mrs. Gladys Brown
Mrs. Paul Couture
Mrs. Margaret C. Hayes
Prof. Carlo Lastrucci
John J. Eagan
Joseph Eichler
Dr. H. H. Fisher
Board of Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union
of Northern California
CHAIRMAN: Prof. Van D. Kennedy
VICE-CHAIRMAN: Rabbi Alvin !. Fine
Helen Saiz
SEC'Y-TREAS.: Howard A. Friedman
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Ernest Besig
GENERAL COUNSEL: Wayne M. Collins
STAFF COUNSEL: Paul Halvonik -
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT: Mrs. Pamela S. Ford
Committee of Sponsors
Mrs. Paul Holmer
Mrs. Mary Hutchinson Prof. Wallace Stegner
Prof. Wilson Record
Prof. Ernest Hilgard Dr. Norman Reider
Dr. John Marquis
Martin Mills, M.D.
Robert L. Nolan, M.D.
Richard Patsey
Mrs. Esther Pike
Henry J. Rodriguez
Eugene N. Rosenberg
Mrs. Muriel Roy
John Brisbin Rutherford
Warren H. Saltzman
Mrs. Alec Skolinick
Stanley D. Stevens
Richard J. Werthimer
Justin Vanderlaan
Joe J. Yasaki
Dr. Marvin J. Naman
Mrs. Theodosia Stewart
Rt. Rev. Sumner Walters
Richard Johnston
Roger Kent
Mes. Ruth Kingman
Prof. Theodore Kreps
Seaton W. Manning
Rey. Robert W. Moon
Clarence E. Rust
Prof. Hubert Phillips
Norman Lezin
Majority Opinon-Justices
Burke, Mosk and Sullivan
The issue here presented is
whether the death penalty and
the procedures following in im-
posing it are constitutional, and
not whether it -should be re-
tained or abolished in California.
Retention or abolition raises a
question of legislative policy
which under our system of divi-
sion of powers falls within the
competence of the Legislature or
the electorate.
A jury found Frederick Sater-
field guilty on two counts of
`first degree murder and fixed
the penalty on each count at
`death; the judgment was af-
firmed . . . A jury also found
Robert Page Anderson guilty of
first degree murder, attempted
murder of three other men, and
first degree robbery, and fixed
the penalty at death for the mur-
der; the judgment was affirmed.
Saterfield and Anderson now
seek habeas corpus on the
grounds that (1) it was improper.
to excuse for cause veniremen
conscientiously opposed to the
death penalty; (2) Penal Code
sections 180 and 190.1 are un-
constitutional because they con-
tain no standards to assist the
trier of fact in determining
whether to impose death or life
imprisonment; (3) the death pen-
alty, per se and as applied, con-
stitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment; and (4) petitioners
have been denied their right to
counsel in post-state-appeal pro-
ceedings. We issued orders to
show cause and pending final de-
termination of the instant pro-
ceedings stayed all judgments of
death in California... .
We hold that the death penalty
is constitutional and does not
constitute cruel or unusual pun-
_ishment, that Penal Code sec-
tions 190 and 190.1 are valid, and
that in keeping with a newly
declared policy of this court, pe-
titioners, and all other indigent
defendants in capital cases, in
the interests of justice, will be
afforded the services of counsel
in all proceedings between the
termination of their state appeals
"and `their execution: We have
further concluded that under the |
compulsion of the June 3, 1968,
decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, the death
penalties in the two cases now
before us must be set aside be-
cause certain prospective jurors
were improperly excused for
cause. It is necessary, therefore,
that petitioners be remanded to
the trial courts for new trials
limited to the issue of penalty.
Excusing Veniremen Opposed
To Death Penalty
Petitioners argue that excus-
ing for cause veniremen con-
scientiously opposed to the death
penalty deprived them of a jury
which fairly represented a cross
section of the community and
tended to assure the state a jury
whose members were favorable
to the prosecution at each phase
of the trial, At Saterfield's trial
two prospective jurors and two
prospective alternate jurors were
excused for cause on the ground
of their opposition to the death
penalty. Likewise at Anderson's
trial seven prospective jurors
and one alternate juror were ex-
cused for cause on that same
ground.
At each trial one or more of
the prospective jurors excused
on that ground did not make it
"unmistakably clear (1) that
{he} would automatically vote
against the imposition of capital
punishment without regard to
any evidence that might be de-
veloped at the trial...
that [his] attitude toward the
death penalty would prevent
{him} from making an impartial
decision as to the defendant's
guilt," as mandated by the With-
erspoon decision . . . For exam-
ple, at Saterfield's trial one pros-
pective juror stated, "I am op-
posed to the death penalty," and
was thereupon excused for cause;
at Anderson's trial one prospec-
tive juror in response to the ques-
tion "Do.you know of any reason
you couldn't be a fair and impar-
tial juror in this case?" replied,
"Yes, sir, I do. I don't believe
or (2) -
in capital punishment" and was
immediately excused for cause.
In neither instance had the court
made it clear to that particular
prospective juror that opposition
to the death penalty or conscien-
tious scruples against that pen-
alty would be insufficient by it-
self to disqualify such a juror
from serving. This is not sur-
prising, because the trials pre-
ceded the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S.
510, which sets forth new rules
that the states are not only com-
pelled to follow but must apply
retroactively.
Witherspoon held "that a sen-
tence of death can not be carried
out if the jury that imposed or
recommended it was chosen by
excluding veniremen for cause
simply because they voiced gen-
eral objections to the death pen-
alty or expressed conscientious
or religious scruples against its
infliction." Witherspoon further
stated that "No defendant can
constitutionally be put to death
at the hands of a tribunal so
selected" but that "nothing we
say today bears upon the power
of a State to execute a defendant
sentenced to death by a jury
from which the only veniremen
who were in fact excluded for
cause were those who made un-
mistakably clear (1) that they
would automatically vote against
the imposition of capital punish-
ment without regard to any evi-
dence that might be developed
at the trial of the case before
them, or (2) that their attitude
toward the death penalty would
prevent them from making an
impartial decision as to the de-
fendant's guilt."
Witherspoon, therefore, re-
quires us to set aside the death
penalties imposed on petitioners
and to have the issue of penalty
retried; 5 = 3.
Witherspoon left undecided
the question whether the exclu-
sion of veniremen opposed to
capital punishment necessitates
setting aside the judgment as to
guilt . . . In the instant case
petitioners made a motion for
an evidentiary hearing regarding
their claim that the exclusion of
veniremen opposed to capital
punishment results in an unrep-
resentative jury on the issue of
guilt and substantially increases
the risk of conviction. We denied
the motion in December 1967.
Petitioners have again requested
such a-hearing and ask that we
reconsider the matter in the
light of Witherspoon. They state
that they, have arranged with
Louis Harris and Associates to
conduct a described study ...
They further state that the Har-
ris study has not yet been fin-
ished and that preparation for an
evidentiary hearing will require
"several more months-at the
least." ... ". .. we cannot sus-
pend the judicial process until
projected studies are made at the
behest of a litigant... ."
Penalty Discretion: Standards
Petitioners further contend
that Penal Code section 190 and
190.1 violate the due process and
equal protection clauses of the
United States Constitution be-
cause those sections, allegedly
without specifying any standards,
impose on the trier of fact the
duty of selecting the penalty. It
is asserted that the absence of
standards prevents a defendant
from knowing how to defend
himself at the penalty trial, per-
mits the trier of fact to impose
the death penalty for arbitrary
reasons, and precludes a mean-
ingful review of the penalty im-
posed. ...
This court has held repeatedly
that under section 190 and 190.1
the Legislature has entrusted te
the absolute discretion of the
trier of fact the awesome deci-
cision between life imprisonment
and death for first degree mur-
der ... and that the law does
not prescribe or authorize the
court to innovate any rule cir-
cumscribing the exercise of that
discretion - that the jury need
not find ameliorating circum-
stances to impose life. imprison-
ment, nor need they find aggra-
vating circumstances to impose
death....
Vesting in the trier of fact un-
guided discretion in the choice
of penalties for first degree mur-
der has long been characteristic
of the laws of the United States
and of many states, ... The
Legislature, by entrusting to the
absolute discretion of the jury
the decision between life impris-
onment and death has indicated
its belief that jurors understand
the factors that are relevant to
such a decision... .
It may be neither practicable
nor desirable that any rigid for-
mula control a trier of fact in
determining whether to extend
mercy by imposing life imprison-
-ment or to deny it by imposing
death. .. . But even if it were
practicable and desirable to have
such a formula it does not fol-
low that the Legislature's failure
to provide one renders the sec-
tions unconstitutional... .
_ No Delegation Of Legislative
Power To Jury
It is also asserted that Penal
Code section 190 and 190.1, as
presently construed and applied,
delegate to the penalty jury a
legislative function in a manner
that violates the section of the
state Constitution providing for
separation of powers. It is ar-
gued that the members of the
jury have been delegated legis-
`lative powers because they must
resolve basic policy questions
with regard to the type of pun-
ishment to be imposed, as op-
posed to the extent of punish-
ment to be imposed. ... The
same contention with regard to
a statute similar to ours was re-
jected by the Supreme Court of
Kansas in State v. Latham ...
Not Cruel Or Unusual
Punishment
It is next contended that for
various reasons the death pen-
alty for first degree murder con-
stitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment of the Unit-
ed States Constitution and sec-
tion 6, article I, of the California
Constitution,
Numerous cases have rejected
claims that the death penalty for
first degree murder constitutes
cruel and unusual] punishment
per se....
Petitioners urge us to recon-
sider the matter. They argue that
the death penalty is cruel and
unusual punishment because it
"inflicts the loss of life with-
out commensurate justification."
They assert that life is a funda-
mental right, that before the
state may restrict a fundamental
right it must demonstrate a
"compelling interest" in so do-
ing, and that to show such an
interest the state must establish
that (1) the restriction imposed
rationally relates to legitimate
governmental objectives sought;
(2) the benefit to the public far
outweighs the impairment of
the constitutional right, and (3)
no alternative means less subver-
sive of the constitutional right
are available. Petitioners assert
that the state's compelling inter-
est is the punishment of crimi-
nals, that the proper functions of
punishment are isolation, reha-
bilitation and deterrence, and do
not include retribution, and that
isolation and rehabilitation can
Excerpts From
Calif. Supreme
Court Opinions
In Death
Penalty Cases
(In re Robert Page Anderson and
In re Frederick Saterfield,
decided November 18, 1968.)
better be achieved by life im-
prisonment than execution, They
offer to establish at an eviden-
tiary hearing that the death
penalty is not a more effective
deterrent than life imprison-
ment...
"The fixing of penalties for
crime is a legislative function.
What constitutes an adequate |
penalty is a matter of legislative
judgment and discretion and the
courts will not. interfere there-
with unless the penalty pre-
scribed is clearly and manifestly
cruel and unusual." .. . In Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, which con-
cluded that denationalization for
wartime desertion constituted a
cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, it was stated "[L]et
us put to one side the death
penalty as an index of the con-
stitutional limit of punishment.
Whatever the arguments may be
against capital punishment, both
on moral grounds and in terms
of accomplishing the purposes of
punishment-and they are force-
ful-the death penalty has been
employed throughout our his-
tory, and, in a day when it is
still widely accepted, it cannot
be said to violate the constitu-
tional concept of cruelty."
Petitioners further argue that
the death penalty is cruel and
unusual in that it is imposed
without standards and can be im-
posed regardless of extenuating
circumstances, The absence of
so-called standards has previous-
ly been discussed. It seems clear
that the death penalty, which has
been repeatedly upheld against
claims that it constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment per se,
does not become cruel or un-
usual as a result of the Legis-
lature's vesting in the trier of
fact discretion to extend mercy
to a convicted first degree mur-
derer....
A further contention is made
that the "anguish of the 1,000
day wait on death row and the
attendant deterioration of per-
sonality" renders the death pen-
alty cruel and unusual....A
similar contention was rejected
in People v. Chessman.
Basic Due Process Not
Violated
Amici next contend that, inde-
pendently of the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment, life is a fun-
damental right protected from
state interference absent a com-
pe'ling state interest, and they
argue at length that the state
cannot establish the existence of
such an interest. They also sug-
gest that under tests other than
that of a compelling state inter-
est the death penalty violates due
process. However, the fixing of
penalties for a crime is a legis-
lative function .. ., and we will
not nullify the legislative judg-
ment as to the appropriate penal-
ties for the heinous crime of
first degree murder. It is for
the Legislature and not this
court to decide whether it is
sound public policy to empower
the imposing of the death pen-
alty. :
Counsel For Indigent
Defendants
Petitioners further contend
that the due process and equal
protection clauses of the United
States Constitution confer upon
indigent defendants in capital
eases the right to appointed
counse] throughout the period
between the termination of their
state appeals and their execu-
tion. ..,
This court has determined that
the appointment of counsel to
represent indigent defendants in
capital cases in all. proceedings
between the termination of their
state appeals and their execu-
tion, such as petitions for cer-
tiorari, habeas corpus petitions
to state and federal courts, ap-
plications for executive clemency
and the conduct of sanity hear-
ings where indicated, will best
serve the cause of justice, the
interests of the defendants and
this court. Counsel will be ap-
pointed routinely in the future
in al] such cases as a matter of
policy.
In view of this policy no pur-
pose would be served by our giv-
ing further consideration to pe-
titioners' claims for the services
of counsel as a matter of right.
Such services will be furnished
these petitioners in keeping with
such policy in any such proceed-
ings in which they are not now -
represented by counsel... .
Concurring Opinion By Mosk, J.
I concur in the opinion of Jus-
tice Burke.
In my years as Attorney Gen-
eral of California (1959-1964), I
frequently repeated a personal
belief in the social invalidity of
the death penalty, notably in
testimony before the California
legislative committees in March
1959, July 1960, and April 1963.
Naturally, therefore, I am
tempted by the invitation of pe-
titioners to join in judicially
terminating this anachronistic
penalty. However, to yield to my
predilections would be to act
wilfully `in the sense of enforc-
ing individual views instead of
speaking humbly as the voice of
the law by which society presum-
ably consents to be ruled." ...
As a judge, I am bound to the
law as I find it to be and not as
I might fervently wish it to be.
I conclude that Justice Burke
has properly stated the current
law of California and of every
other American jurisdiction that
has considered the problem.
CONCURRING AND DISSENT-
ING OPINION BY TOBRINER,
J. {also signed by Chief Justice
Traynor and Justice Peters}.
I concur with the opinion of
Justice Burke insofar as it holds
that Witherspoon v. Illinois
(1968) 391 U.S. 510, requires
that we set aside the penalty
previously imposed in: the two
cases now before us. I agree that
indigent defendants in capital
cases should be entitled to ap-
pointed counsel throughout the
period between the termination
of their state appeals and their
execution. I submit, however,
that sections 190 and 190.1 of
the Penal Code of California vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment -
of the Constitution of the United
States because they provide no
standards or tests whatsoever to
enable judge or jury to decide
why one convicted capital de-
fendant should die and another
should live. The California pen-
alty trial leaves this vital deci-
sion to the unguided whim and
caprice of the trier of fact; this
irrational process, the antithesis
of due process, has no place in
the constitutional structure of
American law. ...
Sections 190 and 190.1 permit
the judge or jury to decree the
random doom of death without
the restraining guide of reason.
Neither society nor the Legisla-
ture nor the courts have said
why one capital defendant
should be selected to die and
another to live. The death pen-
alty has been supported as a
punishment, a deterrent, a safety
valve for revenge, an economy
for the state, and on other
grounds, each of which has been
as hotly defended as it has been
-Continued on Page 4
ACLU NEWS
DECEMBER, 1968
Page 3
ae
Robert Mezey Case
Prof. Fired For
Views On Pot'
Robert Mezey held a position as Assistant Professor of
English at Fresno State College during the 1967-1968 aca-
demic year. Fresno State College President Frederic W.
. Ness, however, has decided not to retain Mezey for the cur-
rent academic year. Ness's decision was made over the
strenuous objections of the De-
partment of English and of the
Dean of the School of Arts and
Sciences.
Petition Filed
Staff Counsel Paul Halvonik
has filed a petition on behalf of
Mezey and the Fresno State Col-
lege Department of English with
State College Chancellor Glenn
Dumke. The petition urges the
Chancellor to reverse his deci-
sion on the grounds that Mezey
was terminated "because of his
views on social issues of the day"
and because the college preced-
ures governing the termination
of an academic employee were
violated in Mezey's case.
Against "Pot" Laws
Mezey became quite a contro-
versial figure in the Fresno com-
munity when he appeared at a
"Panel on Pot" at the State col-
lege and, in the course of the
discussion, stated that he thought
the use of marijuana would not
harm anyone and that if a per-
son wished to use marijuana he
should do so. Mezey stated, "It
is against the law. But I will
take a Thoreau-like position and
say that all laws like that-I
mean laws that are so stupid-
are to be broken until the laws
are off the books."
Community Outraged
As a consequence of those re-
marks a public clamor for Me-
zey's dismissal arose both within
and without the college commun-
ity. A Superior Court judge, for
example, wrote to President Ness
and stated that Mezey was un-
dermining his juvenile court
work. The judge said, "I do not
propose to permit him to destroy
the work of the Juvenile Court
and contribute to the delin-
quency of minors by using his
high position as a professor at
a college and the prestige which
flows from that position to de-
stroy the future lives of the teen-
agers of this community .. . I,
therefore urge that Professor -
Mezey be removed from the staff
of your college as one who is
unfit to occupy the teaching pro-
fession." Similar letters were ad-
dressed to Ness and to the Fac-
ulty Personnel Committee by
members of the Fresno State
College academic community.
Support From Own Department
The English Department was
asked to investigate Mezey and
issue an evaluation report in
light of the complaints that had
been received. The English De- .
partment and the Dean of the
School of Arts and Sciences con-
ducted the requested investiga-
tion and reached the conclusion
that Mezey was an outstanding
teacher and that the complaints
against Mezey were asking the
English Department to punish
Mezey for an exercise of his
right to freedom of speech guar-
anteed by the First Amendment.
Accordingly, the Department of
English recommended Mezey's
retention,
Personnel Committee
The recommendation was
made to the College Personnel
Committee. The Personnel Com-
mittee, in violation of its own
rules, held an in camera hearing
on the issue of whether Mezey,
by his statements at the "panel
on pot,' had engaged in "unpro-
fessional conduct.'' At the con-
ACLU NEWS
DECEMBER, 1968
Page 4
clusion of the hearing the Com-
mittee recommended to Presi-
dent Ness that Mezey not be re-
tained. The recommendation was
unaccompanied by any reasons
and was not, as the college rules
provided, referred back to the
English Department.
President Investigates
Because of the infirmities in
the Personnel Committee hear-
ing Ness decided that he could
not rely upon their recommenda-
tion and decided to conduct an
investigation of his own. He got
together with the English De-
partment and with Mezey in pri-
vate "off the record" meetings
that were devoted almost entire-
ly to Mezey's social and political
views. When those meetings
were concluded, Ness sent a let-
ter to Mezey informing him that
he would not be retained for the
1968-1969 academic year. That
letter, once again in violation of
college rules, contained no rea-
sons for the termination.
Special Panel
Because the procedures in the
Mezey case had been so irregu-
lar, the Fresno State College
Academic Senate convened a spe-
cial panel to hear the Mezey
grievance and to make yet an-
other recommendation to the
President on the question of
`Mezey's retention, The panel
heard testimony from Mezey,
members of the Department of
English, and Dr. Ness and de-
termined that Mezey's grievance
was well-founded and that Mezey
should be retained. President
Ness responded to this recom-
mendation by sending Mezey an-
other letter of termination un-
accompanied by any reason.
ACLU Contentions
The ACLUNC petition on be-
half of Mezey contends that:
Mezey is not being retained
because he expressed views on
issues of contemporary signifi-
cance which were controversial.
Mezey is not being retained be-
cause he exercised his right to
freedom of speech guaranteed
him by the First Amendment tc
the United States Constitution.
The decision of the Dept. of
English to retain Mr. Mezey was
improperly rejected. The only
body that has reviewed Mr.
Mezey's professional ability, the
English Department, has recom-
mended retention. The only body
that has reviewed the procedures
surrounding the decision to dis-
miss Mezey, the grievance panel,
has recommended retention. Both
recommendations were rejected.
by Ness in decisions that con-
tain no reasons, |
Every procedural device de-
veloped to ensure proper con-
sideration of a departmental reg-
ulation has been violated in the
Mezey case.
The reason that the procedures
in the Mezey case were so tor-
tured is because the due process
system was under stress. It was
under stress because Mezey was
being dismissed for an improper
reason,
Legal Action Authorized
At this writing there has been
no response from the Chancel-
lor's office to the petition on be-
half of Mezey. If Chancellor
Dumke should decide not to re-
verse President Ness's decision,
the ACLUNC Board of Directors -
has authorized Halvonik to file
suit on Mezey's behalf. :
xcerpts From
eath Penalty
pinions
Continued from Page 3-
severely attacked. But no one
knows which of these notions.
and as many others as the mind
can conjure, are accidently
seized upon by judge or jury to
grant or deny life. No one knows
what moves judge or jury to se-
lect a capital defendant for
death. We know only that the
motives and notions that deal out
death are as obscure, disordered,
and irrational as the statistical
incidence of the death penalty
itself. . . . Yet the foundation
rock of the law is reason; the
judicial process presupposes
"that its determinations are jus-
tified only when explained or
explainable in reason... .
The irrational process of de-
creeing death cannot be recon-
ciled with a sense of reasoned
justice; we cannot explain why
or when we impose the penalty.
If a civilized society cannot say
why one man should be executed
and another not, it does not ra-
tionally, logically, take life. In-
stead, it grossly denies due proc-
ess of law in inflicting death
upon the basis of a trial that is
capricious, discriminatory, and
guess-infected.
I therefore dissent from the
court's ruling on the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty,
but concur in the opinion on the
issues. (Justice Tobriner's opin-
ion covers 67 pages.)
Concurring And Dissenting
Opinion By McComb, J.
For all the reasons set forth
in Mr. Justice Burke's opinion,
I concur in the decision of the
majority of this court that the
death penalty is constitutional
and does not constitute cruel or
unusual punishment, that Penal
Code sections 190 and 190.1 are
valid, and that petitioners will
be afforded the services of coun-
sel in all proceedings between
the termination of their state ap-
peals and their execution. I re-
spectfully dissent from that por-
tion thereof that sets aside the
death penalties under the com-
pulsion. of Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois....
Berk. Emergency
Cases Dismissed
Continued from Page 2-
George Brunn decided that if the
district attorney did not feel he
could prosecute the defendants
under the City's interpretation
of its regulations that the cases
should be dismissed. Brunn by
dismissing the cases avoided
making any decision about the
constitutionality of the Berkeley
ordinance,
The defendants in the Berkeley
"Emergency' 'cases were repre-
sented by Berkeley volunteer at-
torneys Larry Duga, Albert Ben-
dich, Ken Kawaichi, Demitrios
Agretilis and staff counsel Paul
Halvonik.
Denial of Fair
Hearing in
Security Case
On October 30, Federal Judge
George Harris set aside an order
discharging Arthur R. Grimm
from the Air Force. He was
also restored to the rank he
held prior to his discharge.
Grimm had been charged,
among other things with a se-
curity violation in 1963. In de-
fiance of its own regulation, the
Air Force failed to give Grimm
an unclassified summary of an
Office of Special Investigations
report of the alleged security
violation. The information was
finally provided at an appellate
stage of the proceedings.
_ The court noted that Grimm
"was deprived of an opportunity
to confront witnesses, if any,
against him on the _ security
charge, as well as the failure
on the part of defendants to
furnish him with an unclassified
summary of the OSI report."
Separation of Spouses
Canditions
Of Probation
ACLUNC has asked the Supreme Court of California to
review and reverse a Court of Appeal decision upholding as
constitutional certain conditions of the probation of Aneta
Peeler.
Aneta Peeler pleaded guilty last April to a charge of
possessing marijuana. She was
granted probation for a period
of three years on the condition
that she be incarcerated in the
Butte County jail for 30 days,
that during the first year of the
probationary period she remain
in residence with her parents
and that she not associate with
any known users of marijuana.
Newly Married
On the day prior to her pro-
bation hearing she had married
a Mr. James Peeler, She did not
mention her marriage at the
hearing because when, before
the hearing, she had asked her
attorney how he thought the
court might feel about a "possi-
ble marriage" to Peeler her at-
torney had told her that he be-
lieved that Peeler was involved
in narcotics and that mention of
his name might. jeopardize her
chances for probation.
Court Relief Sought
When Mrs. Peeler concluded
her jail term she petitioned the
court to remove those conditions
of probation which inhibited her
marriage. In addition to the re-
quirement that she reside with
her parents, the condition that
she not associate with any
"known users of marijuana' in-
hibited her marriage because her
husband had been arrested on a-
marijuana offense.
Conditions Extended
The court did not grant Mrs.
Peeler's petition; instead it or-
dered petitioner spend another
60 days in jail and amended the
condition requiring her to avoid
association with "known" users
of marijuana by adding an in-
terdiction of any association with
"reputed" users of marijuana or
drugs. :
Separation Required
The Court of Appeal noted
that the amended condition of
probation "was, effectually, a
command that she live apart
from her husband," but, never-
theless, held that the condition
was constitutional] because it was
"reasonable and relevant to the
offense for which probation was
granted" and because "probation
is not a right but an act of grace
and clemency."
The ACLUNC petition, pre-
pared by staff Counsel Paul Hal-
vonik, contends that the Court
of Appeal applied the wrong
legal principles in the Peeler
case, "A finding that a condition
annexed to the receipt of a pub-
The first right of a citizen
Ts the right
To be responsible
AMERICAN CIVIL
OF NORTHERN
lic benefit is `reasonable and rele-
vant' cannot justify that condi-
tion where fundamental liberties
are involved. The condition can
only be sustained where there
is a showing of a compelling
subordinating state interest."
The brief goes on to note that
the United States Supreme Court
has recognized that the right to
marriage is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the United States
Constitution and that there is no
legitimate state interest that
would justify such a sweeping
inhibition of the marriage rela-
tionship.
Charges Against
Assistant U.S.
Attorney
Continued from Page 2-
Removal Threatened
Ladar then undertook to ad-
vise the lady about her rights.
Besig said this wasn't necessary
and that he should serve the
subpoena. Ladar replied that
unless Besig kept quiet he would
call the Marshal and have him
removed for obstructing justice.
The subpoena was finally
turned over to the lady and Besig
then asked that the passport be
returned as had been agreed,
Ladar said he wasn't going to re-
turn the passport. Besig stated
that was dishonest. Ladar
shrugged his shoulders and he
and Mr. Hennessey walked- off,
The lady's subpoena was re-
turnable on November 27. She
was scheduled to be represented
by Paul N. Halvonik, ACLU staff
counsel,
Protest to Poole
On November. 12, Besig talked
on the telephone with Cecil
Poole, U.S. Attorney, concerning
Ladar's conduct and it was un-
derstood that Poole would look
into the matter. Poole suggested
that under the law the passport
should be turned over to the
Passport Division of the State
Department as having been lost.
Besig insisted that the FBI had
unlawfully taken the passport.
At this writing, no further
word has been heard from Mr.
Poole. Telephone calls have gone
unanswered. If nothing is heard
from Mr. Poole the ACLU will
contact the Attorney General.
Appropriate action will also be
taken to secure the return of
the passport.
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