vol. 33, no. 12

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merican


Civil Liberties


~ Union


Volume XXXIII


SAN FRANCISCO, DECEMBER, 1968


No. 12


S.F. Presidio "Mutiny"


Appalling


Conditions at


Stockade


Private Richard Bunch, an inmate of the Presidio Stock-


ade with a long history of emotional turbulence, was shot


to death on October 11, 1968. Bunch was killed while al-


legedly attempting to escape. A note left behind by Bunch


suggested that his escape was feigned-a deliberate attempt


to draw lethal fire from a shot-


gun guard. The motive? To have


the army participate in his sui-


cide.


Prisoners Sit Down


Bunch's killing did nothing to


alleviate the fears and frustra-


tions of an already disgruntled


inmate population. On the Mon-


day following the Bunch killing


the inmates lined up in their


customary morning formation.


But when the first name of the


roll was called, twenty - seven


prisoners did something uncus-


tomary. They stepped from the


formation and walked to a grassy


area where they sat down and


began singing "freedom" songs.


Singing and Chanting


For the next hour they con-


tinued their singing and chant-


ing, augmenting it occasionally


by lifting their hands to reveal


fingers raised to form a "V."


They also called out names of


persons they wanted to see. They


chanted "We want Hallinan," (a


yeferente io San Francisco at-


torney Terrence Hallinan), `we


want the press" and "we want


Lamont," the latter a reference


to Captain Robert Lamont, Com-


mandant of the Presidio.


Grievances


Their last wish was the only


one to come true, Captain La-


mont arrived about half-way


through the demonstration.


When Lamont appeared one of


the prisoners arose and attempt-


ed to read a list of grievances


that the prisoners wanted recti-


fied. They included requests


that guards at the Stockade be


rotated more frequently; guards


be given psychiatric examina-


tions; racial discrimination end


at the Stockade; the over-crowd-


ed conditions be eliminated; the


sanitary facilities in the Stock-


ade be improved; shot-gun work


details be abolished and that


there be a thorough investigation


of the Bunch killing.


Mutiny Act Read


Lamont refused to listen to


the grievances and instead, ac-


cording to him, read to the pri-


soners from Article 94 of the


Uniform Code of Military Justice.


Article 94 is the "Mutiny Act."


The prisoners continued their


singing and chanting while La-


mont read and it was apparent


to him that he could not be


heard. He then addressed the


prisoners over a_ loudspeaker,


read the Mutiny Act again and


ordered the prisoners to return


to the Stockade barracks. The


prisoners maintain that they did


not hear the Mutiny Act and


that they did not hear the order


given by Lamont. There is no


dispute that the prisoners did


not return to the Stockade build-


ing until escorted there by the


Military Police.


Capital Offense


The result of the demonstra-


tion is that 27 Stockade prisoners


have been charged with a capital


offense, mutiny, because, accord-


ing to the complaint, they "act-


ing jointly and in pursuance of


the common intent, with intent


to override lawful military au-


thority, did, at the Fresidio of


San Francisco, California, on or


about 14 October 1968, refuse in


concert to obey the orders of


Captain Robert S. Lamont to


enter the Stockade .. ."


Pre-Trial Hearing


. The incident of October 14 and


the events that led up to it were


the focus of a military pre-trail


hearing that lasted for over a


week. ACLUNC staff counsel]


Paul Halvonik participated in


that hearing as attorney for


Nesrey Sood, one of the accused.


ACLUNC is participating in the


defense of the "mutineers" be-


cause of a continuing concern


over conditions in the Stockade,


because the severity of the


charge strongly suggests that the


Army is attempting to stifle free-


dom of expression and because


the charge itself, disobeying an


order "with the intent to over-


ride military authority" is a


yaguc and wholly `msypropriste


charge.


The week-long hearing con-


cerned 17 of the 27 accused. The


prisoners, other than Sood, wers


represented by San Francisco


attorneys Terrence Hallinan,


Howard Anawalt, Howard Engel-


skirschen and military counsel:


Captains Tom Fay, Emmett


Yeary and Joe Choate.


No testimony was put on by


the defense at these hearings.


The testimony of the Stockade


personnel, however, established


that the conditions in the stock-


ade have been insufferable and


that the grievances the demon-


strators attempted to bring to


the attention of the army were


well founded. The army's testi-


mony showed that:


Filthy and Overcrowded


For the 56 days preceding the


demonstration the Stockade had


been so overcrowded that it was,


under army regulations, in


"emergency" status. Those same


army regulations require that


an emergency status exist for no


longer than seven days. In the


weeks preceding the demonstra-


tion the Stockade inmates were


receiving insufficient food. Testi-


mony varied on the precise num-


ber of rations being drawn and


the precise number of prisoners


incarcerated during that period


but it is clear that rations for


less than one hundred men were


distributed among a population


of over 120 men, The sanitary


conditions were unspeakable.


There are an insufficient number


of latrines in the Stockade and


those that exist are often un-


usable. One guard testified that


the latrines became so stopped-


up that he observed human ex:


crement floating in the showers.


Guards Poorly Screened


' The screening of the Stockade


guards was also revealed to be


less than adequate. There is, ac-


cording to the testimony of a


guard supervisor, a guard on


duty at the Stockade who treats


black prisoners in a racially dis-


-Continued on Page 2


- composed of Harper,


25 Long-Haired


P.O. Employees


May Be Fired


The San Francisco Post Office


is turning down long-haired and


shaggy bearded applicants for


employment. Under recent de-


partmental regulations an em-


ployee must "be neat and clean


in his appearance and _ habits.


Hair-and beards and mustaches,


if worn-must be kept neatly


-trimmed and clean."


Bruce Overton, 19, was re-


cently accepted for a postal job


at the San Francisco Airport and


then turned down because of his


long hair. He was instructed to


have it cut, but when he reap-


peared with his hair above the


collar Mr. Yarberry informed


him that his hair had to con-


form to styles worn by police-


men. (The San Francisco police


department has no regulation on


the subject, according to the


local press). On the other hand,


Charles W. Harper, director of


management and procedures for


Postmaster Lim P, Lee was


quoted in the press as saying


that he had no objections to long


hair "as long as it isn't too long


. say, above the collar and


neatly trimmed." That's the way


Overton appeared but he was


turned down anyway and chose


to return to his home in southern


California,


Some 25 employees at the San


Francisco Post Office who pres-


ently have long hair and/or


beards are threatened with dis-


ciplinary action unless they cut


their hair and beards. Postal


station superintendents must de-


termine "if the employee's hair,


vearad ad musiache are meatiy


trimmed." From there an ap-


peal lies to the superintendent


of city delivery and finally to


the Appearance Review Board


Charles


O'Donnell, director of operations,


and Joseph Palanshek, director


of installations.


At this point, the Post Office


has merely made threatening


noises. No case has gone to the


Appearance Review Board.


Civil Disobedience


Disappointing Decision


lig


Court Upholds


Death Penalty


The 4-3 decision of the State Supreme Court upholding


the death penaliy as administered in California was a great


disappointment. Expectations of a favorable result grew as


the months passed. The suit was filed in the State Supreme


Court on October 12, 1967; the decision was rendered on


November 18, 1968.


There are, however, some con-


solations. Because of the suit no


executions occurred during the


period when the matter was be-_


fore the Supreme Court and the


death penalties of Anderson aN


Saterfield were reversed. They


were reversed on the ground that


the juries. which imposed the sen-


tences of death were "hanging


juries" from which all persons


opposed to the death penalty had


been excluded. The U.S. Supreme


Court recently held, in Wither.


spoon v. Illinois, that hanging


juries are constitutionally im-


permissable, a decision that did


not occur until long after


ACLUNC and the Legal Defense


Fund had intervened on behalf


of Anderson and Saterfield; if


we had not intervened they would


probably have been executed be-


Sonoma County


Council Granted


Chapter Status


The Sonoma County Council,


created in the Fall of 1966, was


granted Chapter status by unani-


mous vote of the Branch Board


of Directors on November 14th.


The new Chapter has a mem-


bership of 200, and a strong pool


of active werkeors, Four public


meetings have been held by the


Council, notably the September


`meeting featuring Dr. Spock at


which the community was ap-


praised of the state of Civil Lib-


erties and the Draft, and funds


were raised.


Now that Sonoma has been


granted Chapter status, there are


eleven Chapters of the American


Civil Liberties Union of North-


ern California.


ACLU Prevails in Teaching


Credentials Cases


The Credentials Committee of the California State Board


of Education is re-examining the credentials of all teachers


and applicants for teaching credentials arrested in connec-


tion with political demonstrations. Six of the teachers have


recently sought help from ACLUNC; more are expected.


Three cases were successfully


concluded last month. Martin


Ponch and Paul Obluda of San


Francisco, both active in the War


Resisters League, appeared at in-


forma] hearings on November 18


and 19 and persuaded the Com-


mittee on Credentials to drop


further proceedings against their


credentials. Mrs. Toby Hendon,


whose application for a creden-


tial has been delayed, was told


after a hearing that her creden-


tial would be granted.


Induction Center Arrests


- All three had been arrested


during demonstrations outside


the Oakland Induction Center.


The three were represented at


the hearings by. ACLUNC assis-


tant staff counsel Charles Mar-


son.


Three similar cases will soon


be heard. They concern Genevi-


eve McDonald of South San


Francisco, Susan Roberts of Ber-


keley, and Alvin Wasserman of


San Anselmo. 0x00B0


At the hearings, the members


of the Credentials Committee ex-


pressed concern that one who


disobeys "authority" in the


streets by engaging in an act


of peaceful civil disobedience


might disobey school authorities


as well. The logic of this con-


cern was not discussed.


Moral Turpitude


In Hallinan v. Committee of


Bar Examiners (1966) 65 Cal.


2nd 447, the Committee of Bar


Examiners had refused to certify


Hallinan, who has been arrested


six times and convicted twice on


misdeameanor charges arising


out of "sit-ins". The court re-


versed the Committe and ordered


it to certify Hallinan as quali-


fied to practice law, stating:


"We do not believe that peti-


tioner's participation in the civil


disobedience here shown can be


characterized as involving moral


turpitude. If we were to deny


every person who has engaged in


a `sit-in' or other form of non-


violent civil disobedience, and


who has been convicted therefor,


the right to enter a licensed pro- -


fession, we would deprive the


community of the services of


many highly qualified persons of


the highest moral courage. This


should not be done."


fore Witherspoon was decided.


Additionally, the Court held


that in the future all condemned


men will be given court-appoint-


ed counsel to pursue their legal


claims up to the moment they


are executed or are released from


death row. We had advanced this


right to counsel as a constitution-


al right, the court adopted it as


a matter of "policy." When the


litigation began a condemned


man had no right to counsel after


his conviction was affirmed by


the State Supreme Court; during


the last session of the Legislature


a bill sponsored jointly by


ACLUNC and the Friends Com-


mittee on Legislation extended


the right to counsel to review in


the United States Supreme Court;


now a condemned man will also


have counsel for habeas corpus


proceedings in the state and


federal courts, for clemency hear-


ings and for sanity hearings,


Constitutional Issue


But we did lose on the most


significant issue: the constitution-


ality of the death penalty, Where


the litigation will continue has


not yet been decided. The United


States Supreme Court and the


Federal District Court are the


two fora now available. The


death penalty challenge began


as a Federal District Court suit;


it was returned to the State court


under' a Federal court order re-


quiring the petitioners to `"ex-


haust their state remedies."


Those remedies have been thor-


oughly exhausted and suit is still


pending in the Federal court.


One thing is clear: before anyone


is again executed in California -


the Federal courts will have to


decide whether California's


death penalty meets constitution-


al standards.


The lawyers for Anderson and


Saterfield are Paul Halvonik for


ACLUNC, Anthony G. Amster-


dam for NAACP/LDF and volun-


teer attorneys Jerome Falk, Gary


Berger, Roy Eisenhardt and Har-


ry Kraemer,


High Court


Hears Student


Armband Case


The U.S. Supreme Court last


month heard oral arguments in


the cases of three Des Moines,


Iowa, public school students who


were disciplined for wearing


black armbands to schoo] in De-


cember 1965 to express their


views about the Vietnam war.


They said they wore them to


mourn the dead and to support


a proposal to extend the Christ-


mas truce,


The case raises important free-


dom of expression issues for


public school children. If the


educational process is not inter- .


fered with and there are no dis-


ciplinary problems, may school


administrators limit the freedom


of students?


A couple of months ago the


court refused to hear a Dallas


case which challenged the right


of school officials to bar stu-


dents with long hair. In Cali-


fornia, the lower courts have


ruled against students in such


cases. In the Gregor Myers case


from Arcata, in which a student


was suspended for violating a


regulation prohibiting "extreme"


haircuts, a decision of the State


District Court of Appeal is being


awaited,


State College Project


Sacramentans


Oppose Bill of


Rights Petition


A large group of Sacramento State College freshmen


fanned out over Sacramento recently to seek endorsements


of a petition titled "Americans in Support of Civil Liberties."


The 130 students, members of an anthropology class, con-


tacted more than 7,500 persons from Capitol Park to Sierra


Oaks to Del Paso Heights to re-


quest signatures on the following


petition: :


The Petition


"We, the undersigned residents


of Sacramento County, believe


that all federal, state and local


officials should be required to


conform to each of the following


rules: cent


"1. The right to trial by jury.


"2. The right of the people to


freedom of the press, freedom


of speech, the right to peacefully


assemble and the right to peti-


tion.


"3. No person shall be tried


twice for the same offense, nor


compelled to testify against him-


self, nor be deprived of life or


liberty without due process of


law.


"4, An accused person has the


right to a speedy trial, to be in-


formed of the charges against


him and to have the assistance of


a lawyer in his defense.


"5. Excessive bail should not |


be required nor excessive fines


be imposed.


"6. No person shall be de-


prived of his rights on the basis


of his race, color or religion."


Two Out of Three Refuse


Of the 7,600 persons: contacted,


more than 5,000 refused to en-


dorse these principles. These in-


cluded a state legislator who


looked at No. 2 and said, "I'm


opposed to it. All it does is per-


mit riots and demonstrations."


Many balked and declined to


read further when they saw the


words "Civil Liberties" in bold


print in the petition title, appar-


ently suspicious of the term.


The six "rules" they seeming-


ly refused to go along with are,


of course shortened versions of


Articles 1, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the


U. S. Bill of Rights, plus a para-


phrase of the 14th Amendment to


the U. S. Constitution.


Objections


The reasons given for not sign-


ing the petition, the students re-


ported, included these:


"If you really want this kind


of thing, why don't you try to get


on the ballot?"


"Ym patriotic. I don't want


to get involved in this type of


thing."


"You should be in jail: your


whole organization should be


put in jail for distributing this


kind of material."


"T don't believe in that sort of


thing." !


Man in front of the police sta-


tion: "I'm not going to sign.


There are too many rights al-


ready."


"There's too much welfare al-


ready."


Communistic


Husband and wife, both school


teachers: "This is communistic


and anti-American. Are you being


paid to circulate this?


"Ym in the military. I can't


support this type of thing."


"Tf I sign this and my boss


sees it, I could get in trouble."


"T can't sign this. I'm a conser-


vative Republican."


"This sounds like John Birch


Society stuff."


"T ean't sign. I wouldn't make


a good hippie."


"Yd better not sign until my


husband has a chance to read


it


ACLU NEWS


DECEMBER, 1968


Page 2


Not Practical


Lobbyist at the Capitol: "I


couldn't sign. These things are


not practical. They won't work."


"Youwre crazy."


"Go to hell."


"T think it's too ambiguous."


"All this is just an excuse to


riot."


Negro woman in Del Paso


Heights: "I could sign, but I don't


want people throwing stones at


my house or burning it down."


Campaign Headquarters


Nobody at Nixon campaign


headquarters would sign. Wal-


lace headquarters hedged, then


called on the area chairman who


signed. Several signed at Hum-


phrey headquarters (somebody


there had prior knowledge of the


petition project).


The students who discussed


the project in class the other


day, said many non-signers, es-


pecially government workers and


professional people, indicated


they were hesitant for fear their


jobs, careers or positions in the


community could be affected by


signing what might be seen as


a "radical" petition.


Others were cool to the whole


idea, suspecting it might be the


work of a radical group with


whom they might become identi-


fied. ;


Some Enthusiasts


But there were some enthusi-


asts, including an elderly man


who put down a load of books,


put on his spectacles, read it


carefully and said, "I really be-


lieve in all this." Some recog-


nized the principles and signed;


others recommended neighbors


who could be expected to sign.


The project was directed by


Asst. Prof. Howard P. Goldfried


of the SSC Anthropology De-


partment, who concluded:


"This raises an extremely seri-


ous question: You can legitimate-


ly ask just how politically edu-


cated and politically aware the


voters are. Democracy can func-


tion only if you have an educated


electorate. This kind of thing


questions whether we have one."


-Column by Art McGinn, Look-


ing Around, Sacramento Bee,


November 15, 1968.


Berkeley


S.F. Presidio Unethical Practices


Charges Made


Against Asst.


U.S. Attorney


The ACLU last month charged the United States Attor-


ney's office and Asst. U.S. Attorney Jerrold Ladar with un-


ethical practices. The complaint involved the seizure by the


F.B.I. of the passport of a young lady, J.M., 26. The passport


was in the young lady's luggage which was stored in the


`Mutiny' Case


Continued from Page 1-


criminatory manner. Guards


have, without provocation and in


violation of army regulations,


pointed their weapons at prison-


ers. Guards have also indulged


in "horseplay" with firearms.


On one occasion a gun was dis-


charged during "horseplay" and


a hole was shot in the ceiling of


a building near the Stockade.


Suicide attempts have been oc-


curring at the Presidio at a rate


of about five per month. The


army dismisses these attempts as


mere "gestures." In one such


gesture a man slit his throat,


was taken to the hospital where


his wound required numerous


stitches and was returned that


same day to a Stockade isolation


cell. The isolation cell painted


black, contained no toilet, nor


was there any place to sit or lie


other than an iron grating placed


against the wall.


Tale of Violence


The level of compassion for


the inmates may be measured


by the actions of a guard super-


visor during the period between


_the Bunch killing and the de-


monstration.The chief topic of


conversation among the prisoners


was, quite naturally, the killing


of Bunch and the guard super-


visor took that opportunity to


tell the men that he, personally,


had killed a Vietnamese woman


by shooting her three times in


the stomach with a pistol. At


the hearing the guard supervisor


insisted that he had not in fact


shot a Vietnamese woman. He


could give no reason for telling


the prisoners that story at such


a critical time. .


ACLUNC has taken the posi-


tion that there was no mutiny at


the Stockade on October 14.


1968. The prisoners conducted a


peaceful and nonviolent demon-


stration to secure a hearing for


grievances that were substantial;


their demonstration was the only


manner in which they could peti-


tion for a redress of their griev-


ances. ACLUNC has suggested


that the Army drop its `charges


of mutiny and, instead, rectify


the Stockade conditions that led


to the demonstration.


crossed the thousand mark and,


after the first membership cam-


paign in 1952, the membership


jumped from 1855 to 3029.


Membership


Figures -


During the past ten years the


ACLU membership has climbed


from 4078 to 7629 on October


31, 1968.


Established in September 1934,


the branch membership grew


slowly. After ten years, it stood


at only 742. In 1946 it finally


`State of


Emergency' Cases Dismissed


ACLUNC's attack on the constitutionality of the Berkeley


ordinance which permits the City Manager to declare "states


of civil emergency" and the challenge to the constitutionality


of "regulations" adopted pursuant to that ordinance during


two separate occasions in Berkeley this past summer, con-


tinues to be thwarted by victory.


The promulgation of the first


state of emergency imposed a


curfew throughout the city of


Berkeley. The promulgation dur-


ing the second emergency pro-


hibited "loitering" and banned


all public meetings. When the


second "state of emergency" was


promulgated ACLUNC and its


Berkeley-Albany chapter brought


suit in the Federal District Court


to enjoin enforcement of the or-


dinance and the "regulations"


prohibiting loitering and bann-


ing public meetings. Before the


federal court suit could be heard,


however, the Berkeley City Coun-


cil, on recommendation of the


City Manager, rescinded the


"regulations."


The battle then shifted to the


Berkeley Municipal Court where


ACLU defended persons arrested


for violating the rules and regu-


`lations.


Both sides filed extensive


briefs on the constitutionality of


the ordinance and the regula-


tions. ACLU took the position


that they were all unconsitution-


al on their face. The Berkeley


city attorney took the position


that the ordinance and the rules


adopted pursuant to it should not


be read "on their face' but


should be interpreted to prohibit


only "loitering" and public meet-


ings that "endangered life or


property." The district attorney


took the position that if the


City's interpretation of the regu-


lations was adopted, no case


could be proved against the de-


fendants.


Berkeley Municipal Judge


-Continued on Page 4


basement of the Richmond home


of a couple whom she knew only


casually. The F.B.I. searched the


place for contraband and assert-


edly found explosives, but they


also searched the lady's posses-


sions and seized her passport.


When the lady sought her be-


longings and discovered that the


F.B.I, had seized her passport


she telephoned Agent Jones, 2118


Milvia St., Berkeley. He readily


admitted he was holding her


passport.


Intimidation


As the young lady put it, Mr.


Jones "came on very strong."


She teld him she was after her


passport, and he wanted to know


where she was. She told him


she'd like to pick up the pass-


port and that she'd be in on Fri-


day. "Oh, no," he responded,


"we're not going to wait until


Friday; you'll come in now!" She


protested that she was ill and


could not come in until Friday.


Then he wanted to know who her


doctor was because they would


have to check her asserted ill-


ness. "If you don't come before


Friday, we will come to get you,"


Jones is reported to have said.


"You have to clear yourself!"


The lady had no objection to


talking with Jones, but because


of her indisposition she wasn't


prepared to do so before Friday.


Because of his insistence, how-


ever, she contacted the ACLU.


ACLU Intervenes -


Ernest Besig telephoned Jones


and demanded that he return the


lady's passport because it was


seized illegally. Jones wanted to


know where the lady lived but he


was told this information would-


n't be given; that the passport.


could be returned through the


ACLU office.


Agreement Made


Later, Jones called Besig and


said that the passport was being


sent to the office of Asst. U. S.


Attorney Jerrold Ladar and that


he could telephone Mr. Ladar


about it. Besig did telephone La-


dar who stated his willingness to


return the passport if he could


serve a subpoena upon the lady


to testify before the Federal


Grand Jury. Besig said that was


agreeable with him and that he


would arrange for the lady's ap-'


pearance at the U. S, Attorney's


office. It was finally agreed to


meet at the U. S. Attorney's of-


fice in San Francisco at 10 a.m.


on Friday, November 8.


Residence Sought


The lady appeared with a


friend and Mr. Besig and Mr.


Ladar presented himself at the


counter with an F.B.I. agent


whom he introduced as Mr. Hen-


nesey, Mr, Ladar then asked the


lady where she lived. Besig in-


structed her not to answer the


question because it would lead to


more F.B.I, harassment. Ladar ~


then wanted to know whether


Besig was a member of the Cali- |


fornia bar, and he responded by


: saying that. it didn't make any


difference. He nevertheless in-


sisted and besig stated he was


a member of the New York bar.


-Continued on Page 4


AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION NEWS


Published by the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California


Second Class Mail privileges authorized at San Francisco, California


ERNEST BESIG .. . Editor


503 Market Street, San Francisco, California 94105, 433-2750


Subcription Rates - Two Dollars and Fifty Cents a Year.


Twenty-Five Cents Per Copy


Ralph B. Atkinson


Albert M. Bendich


Leo Borregard


Rey. Hamilton Boswell


Price M. Cobbs, M.D.


Prof, John Edwards


Robert Greensfelder


Rey, Aron S. Gilmartin


Evelio Grillo


Mrs. Zora Cheever Gross


Francis Heisler


Neil F. Horton


Howard H. Jewel


Gerald D. Marcus


Ephraim Margolin


Honorary Treasurer:


Joseph $. Thompson


Honorary Board Member:


Sara Bard Field


Mrs. Gladys Brown


Mrs. Paul Couture


Mrs. Margaret C. Hayes


Prof. Carlo Lastrucci


John J. Eagan


Joseph Eichler


Dr. H. H. Fisher


Board of Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union


of Northern California


CHAIRMAN: Prof. Van D. Kennedy


VICE-CHAIRMAN: Rabbi Alvin !. Fine


Helen Saiz


SEC'Y-TREAS.: Howard A. Friedman


EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Ernest Besig


GENERAL COUNSEL: Wayne M. Collins


STAFF COUNSEL: Paul Halvonik -


ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT: Mrs. Pamela S. Ford


Committee of Sponsors


Mrs. Paul Holmer


Mrs. Mary Hutchinson Prof. Wallace Stegner


Prof. Wilson Record


Prof. Ernest Hilgard Dr. Norman Reider


Dr. John Marquis


Martin Mills, M.D.


Robert L. Nolan, M.D.


Richard Patsey


Mrs. Esther Pike


Henry J. Rodriguez


Eugene N. Rosenberg


Mrs. Muriel Roy


John Brisbin Rutherford


Warren H. Saltzman


Mrs. Alec Skolinick


Stanley D. Stevens


Richard J. Werthimer


Justin Vanderlaan


Joe J. Yasaki


Dr. Marvin J. Naman


Mrs. Theodosia Stewart


Rt. Rev. Sumner Walters


Richard Johnston


Roger Kent


Mes. Ruth Kingman


Prof. Theodore Kreps


Seaton W. Manning


Rey. Robert W. Moon


Clarence E. Rust


Prof. Hubert Phillips


Norman Lezin


Majority Opinon-Justices


Burke, Mosk and Sullivan


The issue here presented is


whether the death penalty and


the procedures following in im-


posing it are constitutional, and


not whether it -should be re-


tained or abolished in California.


Retention or abolition raises a


question of legislative policy


which under our system of divi-


sion of powers falls within the


competence of the Legislature or


the electorate.


A jury found Frederick Sater-


field guilty on two counts of


`first degree murder and fixed


the penalty on each count at


`death; the judgment was af-


firmed . . . A jury also found


Robert Page Anderson guilty of


first degree murder, attempted


murder of three other men, and


first degree robbery, and fixed


the penalty at death for the mur-


der; the judgment was affirmed.


Saterfield and Anderson now


seek habeas corpus on the


grounds that (1) it was improper.


to excuse for cause veniremen


conscientiously opposed to the


death penalty; (2) Penal Code


sections 180 and 190.1 are un-


constitutional because they con-


tain no standards to assist the


trier of fact in determining


whether to impose death or life


imprisonment; (3) the death pen-


alty, per se and as applied, con-


stitutes cruel and unusual pun-


ishment; and (4) petitioners


have been denied their right to


counsel in post-state-appeal pro-


ceedings. We issued orders to


show cause and pending final de-


termination of the instant pro-


ceedings stayed all judgments of


death in California... .


We hold that the death penalty


is constitutional and does not


constitute cruel or unusual pun-


_ishment, that Penal Code sec-


tions 190 and 190.1 are valid, and


that in keeping with a newly


declared policy of this court, pe-


titioners, and all other indigent


defendants in capital cases, in


the interests of justice, will be


afforded the services of counsel


in all proceedings between the


termination of their state appeals


"and `their execution: We have


further concluded that under the |


compulsion of the June 3, 1968,


decision of the United States Su-


preme Court in Witherspoon v.


Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, the death


penalties in the two cases now


before us must be set aside be-


cause certain prospective jurors


were improperly excused for


cause. It is necessary, therefore,


that petitioners be remanded to


the trial courts for new trials


limited to the issue of penalty.


Excusing Veniremen Opposed


To Death Penalty


Petitioners argue that excus-


ing for cause veniremen con-


scientiously opposed to the death


penalty deprived them of a jury


which fairly represented a cross


section of the community and


tended to assure the state a jury


whose members were favorable


to the prosecution at each phase


of the trial, At Saterfield's trial


two prospective jurors and two


prospective alternate jurors were


excused for cause on the ground


of their opposition to the death


penalty. Likewise at Anderson's


trial seven prospective jurors


and one alternate juror were ex-


cused for cause on that same


ground.


At each trial one or more of


the prospective jurors excused


on that ground did not make it


"unmistakably clear (1) that


{he} would automatically vote


against the imposition of capital


punishment without regard to


any evidence that might be de-


veloped at the trial...


that [his] attitude toward the


death penalty would prevent


{him} from making an impartial


decision as to the defendant's


guilt," as mandated by the With-


erspoon decision . . . For exam-


ple, at Saterfield's trial one pros-


pective juror stated, "I am op-


posed to the death penalty," and


was thereupon excused for cause;


at Anderson's trial one prospec-


tive juror in response to the ques-


tion "Do.you know of any reason


you couldn't be a fair and impar-


tial juror in this case?" replied,


"Yes, sir, I do. I don't believe


or (2) -


in capital punishment" and was


immediately excused for cause.


In neither instance had the court


made it clear to that particular


prospective juror that opposition


to the death penalty or conscien-


tious scruples against that pen-


alty would be insufficient by it-


self to disqualify such a juror


from serving. This is not sur-


prising, because the trials pre-


ceded the decision of the United


States Supreme Court in Wither-


spoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S.


510, which sets forth new rules


that the states are not only com-


pelled to follow but must apply


retroactively.


Witherspoon held "that a sen-


tence of death can not be carried


out if the jury that imposed or


recommended it was chosen by


excluding veniremen for cause


simply because they voiced gen-


eral objections to the death pen-


alty or expressed conscientious


or religious scruples against its


infliction." Witherspoon further


stated that "No defendant can


constitutionally be put to death


at the hands of a tribunal so


selected" but that "nothing we


say today bears upon the power


of a State to execute a defendant


sentenced to death by a jury


from which the only veniremen


who were in fact excluded for


cause were those who made un-


mistakably clear (1) that they


would automatically vote against


the imposition of capital punish-


ment without regard to any evi-


dence that might be developed


at the trial of the case before


them, or (2) that their attitude


toward the death penalty would


prevent them from making an


impartial decision as to the de-


fendant's guilt."


Witherspoon, therefore, re-


quires us to set aside the death


penalties imposed on petitioners


and to have the issue of penalty


retried; 5 = 3.


Witherspoon left undecided


the question whether the exclu-


sion of veniremen opposed to


capital punishment necessitates


setting aside the judgment as to


guilt . . . In the instant case


petitioners made a motion for


an evidentiary hearing regarding


their claim that the exclusion of


veniremen opposed to capital


punishment results in an unrep-


resentative jury on the issue of


guilt and substantially increases


the risk of conviction. We denied


the motion in December 1967.


Petitioners have again requested


such a-hearing and ask that we


reconsider the matter in the


light of Witherspoon. They state


that they, have arranged with


Louis Harris and Associates to


conduct a described study ...


They further state that the Har-


ris study has not yet been fin-


ished and that preparation for an


evidentiary hearing will require


"several more months-at the


least." ... ". .. we cannot sus-


pend the judicial process until


projected studies are made at the


behest of a litigant... ."


Penalty Discretion: Standards


Petitioners further contend


that Penal Code section 190 and


190.1 violate the due process and


equal protection clauses of the


United States Constitution be-


cause those sections, allegedly


without specifying any standards,


impose on the trier of fact the


duty of selecting the penalty. It


is asserted that the absence of


standards prevents a defendant


from knowing how to defend


himself at the penalty trial, per-


mits the trier of fact to impose


the death penalty for arbitrary


reasons, and precludes a mean-


ingful review of the penalty im-


posed. ...


This court has held repeatedly


that under section 190 and 190.1


the Legislature has entrusted te


the absolute discretion of the


trier of fact the awesome deci-


cision between life imprisonment


and death for first degree mur-


der ... and that the law does


not prescribe or authorize the


court to innovate any rule cir-


cumscribing the exercise of that


discretion - that the jury need


not find ameliorating circum-


stances to impose life. imprison-


ment, nor need they find aggra-


vating circumstances to impose


death....


Vesting in the trier of fact un-


guided discretion in the choice


of penalties for first degree mur-


der has long been characteristic


of the laws of the United States


and of many states, ... The


Legislature, by entrusting to the


absolute discretion of the jury


the decision between life impris-


onment and death has indicated


its belief that jurors understand


the factors that are relevant to


such a decision... .


It may be neither practicable


nor desirable that any rigid for-


mula control a trier of fact in


determining whether to extend


mercy by imposing life imprison-


-ment or to deny it by imposing


death. .. . But even if it were


practicable and desirable to have


such a formula it does not fol-


low that the Legislature's failure


to provide one renders the sec-


tions unconstitutional... .


_ No Delegation Of Legislative


Power To Jury


It is also asserted that Penal


Code section 190 and 190.1, as


presently construed and applied,


delegate to the penalty jury a


legislative function in a manner


that violates the section of the


state Constitution providing for


separation of powers. It is ar-


gued that the members of the


jury have been delegated legis-


`lative powers because they must


resolve basic policy questions


with regard to the type of pun-


ishment to be imposed, as op-


posed to the extent of punish-


ment to be imposed. ... The


same contention with regard to


a statute similar to ours was re-


jected by the Supreme Court of


Kansas in State v. Latham ...


Not Cruel Or Unusual


Punishment


It is next contended that for


various reasons the death pen-


alty for first degree murder con-


stitutes cruel and unusual pun-


ishment in violation of the


Eighth Amendment of the Unit-


ed States Constitution and sec-


tion 6, article I, of the California


Constitution,


Numerous cases have rejected


claims that the death penalty for


first degree murder constitutes


cruel and unusual] punishment


per se....


Petitioners urge us to recon-


sider the matter. They argue that


the death penalty is cruel and


unusual punishment because it


"inflicts the loss of life with-


out commensurate justification."


They assert that life is a funda-


mental right, that before the


state may restrict a fundamental


right it must demonstrate a


"compelling interest" in so do-


ing, and that to show such an


interest the state must establish


that (1) the restriction imposed


rationally relates to legitimate


governmental objectives sought;


(2) the benefit to the public far


outweighs the impairment of


the constitutional right, and (3)


no alternative means less subver-


sive of the constitutional right


are available. Petitioners assert


that the state's compelling inter-


est is the punishment of crimi-


nals, that the proper functions of


punishment are isolation, reha-


bilitation and deterrence, and do


not include retribution, and that


isolation and rehabilitation can


Excerpts From


Calif. Supreme


Court Opinions


In Death


Penalty Cases


(In re Robert Page Anderson and


In re Frederick Saterfield,


decided November 18, 1968.)


better be achieved by life im-


prisonment than execution, They


offer to establish at an eviden-


tiary hearing that the death


penalty is not a more effective


deterrent than life imprison-


ment...


"The fixing of penalties for


crime is a legislative function.


What constitutes an adequate |


penalty is a matter of legislative


judgment and discretion and the


courts will not. interfere there-


with unless the penalty pre-


scribed is clearly and manifestly


cruel and unusual." .. . In Trop


v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, which con-


cluded that denationalization for


wartime desertion constituted a


cruel and unusual punishment


within the meaning of the Eighth


Amendment, it was stated "[L]et


us put to one side the death


penalty as an index of the con-


stitutional limit of punishment.


Whatever the arguments may be


against capital punishment, both


on moral grounds and in terms


of accomplishing the purposes of


punishment-and they are force-


ful-the death penalty has been


employed throughout our his-


tory, and, in a day when it is


still widely accepted, it cannot


be said to violate the constitu-


tional concept of cruelty."


Petitioners further argue that


the death penalty is cruel and


unusual in that it is imposed


without standards and can be im-


posed regardless of extenuating


circumstances, The absence of


so-called standards has previous-


ly been discussed. It seems clear


that the death penalty, which has


been repeatedly upheld against


claims that it constitutes cruel


and unusual punishment per se,


does not become cruel or un-


usual as a result of the Legis-


lature's vesting in the trier of


fact discretion to extend mercy


to a convicted first degree mur-


derer....


A further contention is made


that the "anguish of the 1,000


day wait on death row and the


attendant deterioration of per-


sonality" renders the death pen-


alty cruel and unusual....A


similar contention was rejected


in People v. Chessman.


Basic Due Process Not


Violated


Amici next contend that, inde-


pendently of the constitutional


prohibition against cruel and un-


usual punishment, life is a fun-


damental right protected from


state interference absent a com-


pe'ling state interest, and they


argue at length that the state


cannot establish the existence of


such an interest. They also sug-


gest that under tests other than


that of a compelling state inter-


est the death penalty violates due


process. However, the fixing of


penalties for a crime is a legis-


lative function .. ., and we will


not nullify the legislative judg-


ment as to the appropriate penal-


ties for the heinous crime of


first degree murder. It is for


the Legislature and not this


court to decide whether it is


sound public policy to empower


the imposing of the death pen-


alty. :


Counsel For Indigent


Defendants


Petitioners further contend


that the due process and equal


protection clauses of the United


States Constitution confer upon


indigent defendants in capital


eases the right to appointed


counse] throughout the period


between the termination of their


state appeals and their execu-


tion. ..,


This court has determined that


the appointment of counsel to


represent indigent defendants in


capital cases in all. proceedings


between the termination of their


state appeals and their execu-


tion, such as petitions for cer-


tiorari, habeas corpus petitions


to state and federal courts, ap-


plications for executive clemency


and the conduct of sanity hear-


ings where indicated, will best


serve the cause of justice, the


interests of the defendants and


this court. Counsel will be ap-


pointed routinely in the future


in al] such cases as a matter of


policy.


In view of this policy no pur-


pose would be served by our giv-


ing further consideration to pe-


titioners' claims for the services


of counsel as a matter of right.


Such services will be furnished


these petitioners in keeping with


such policy in any such proceed-


ings in which they are not now -


represented by counsel... .


Concurring Opinion By Mosk, J.


I concur in the opinion of Jus-


tice Burke.


In my years as Attorney Gen-


eral of California (1959-1964), I


frequently repeated a personal


belief in the social invalidity of


the death penalty, notably in


testimony before the California


legislative committees in March


1959, July 1960, and April 1963.


Naturally, therefore, I am


tempted by the invitation of pe-


titioners to join in judicially


terminating this anachronistic


penalty. However, to yield to my


predilections would be to act


wilfully `in the sense of enforc-


ing individual views instead of


speaking humbly as the voice of


the law by which society presum-


ably consents to be ruled." ...


As a judge, I am bound to the


law as I find it to be and not as


I might fervently wish it to be.


I conclude that Justice Burke


has properly stated the current


law of California and of every


other American jurisdiction that


has considered the problem.


CONCURRING AND DISSENT-


ING OPINION BY TOBRINER,


J. {also signed by Chief Justice


Traynor and Justice Peters}.


I concur with the opinion of


Justice Burke insofar as it holds


that Witherspoon v. Illinois


(1968) 391 U.S. 510, requires


that we set aside the penalty


previously imposed in: the two


cases now before us. I agree that


indigent defendants in capital


cases should be entitled to ap-


pointed counsel throughout the


period between the termination


of their state appeals and their


execution. I submit, however,


that sections 190 and 190.1 of


the Penal Code of California vio-


late the Fourteenth Amendment -


of the Constitution of the United


States because they provide no


standards or tests whatsoever to


enable judge or jury to decide


why one convicted capital de-


fendant should die and another


should live. The California pen-


alty trial leaves this vital deci-


sion to the unguided whim and


caprice of the trier of fact; this


irrational process, the antithesis


of due process, has no place in


the constitutional structure of


American law. ...


Sections 190 and 190.1 permit


the judge or jury to decree the


random doom of death without


the restraining guide of reason.


Neither society nor the Legisla-


ture nor the courts have said


why one capital defendant


should be selected to die and


another to live. The death pen-


alty has been supported as a


punishment, a deterrent, a safety


valve for revenge, an economy


for the state, and on other


grounds, each of which has been


as hotly defended as it has been


-Continued on Page 4


ACLU NEWS


DECEMBER, 1968


Page 3


ae


Robert Mezey Case


Prof. Fired For


Views On Pot'


Robert Mezey held a position as Assistant Professor of


English at Fresno State College during the 1967-1968 aca-


demic year. Fresno State College President Frederic W.


. Ness, however, has decided not to retain Mezey for the cur-


rent academic year. Ness's decision was made over the


strenuous objections of the De-


partment of English and of the


Dean of the School of Arts and


Sciences.


Petition Filed


Staff Counsel Paul Halvonik


has filed a petition on behalf of


Mezey and the Fresno State Col-


lege Department of English with


State College Chancellor Glenn


Dumke. The petition urges the


Chancellor to reverse his deci-


sion on the grounds that Mezey


was terminated "because of his


views on social issues of the day"


and because the college preced-


ures governing the termination


of an academic employee were


violated in Mezey's case.


Against "Pot" Laws


Mezey became quite a contro-


versial figure in the Fresno com-


munity when he appeared at a


"Panel on Pot" at the State col-


lege and, in the course of the


discussion, stated that he thought


the use of marijuana would not


harm anyone and that if a per-


son wished to use marijuana he


should do so. Mezey stated, "It


is against the law. But I will


take a Thoreau-like position and


say that all laws like that-I


mean laws that are so stupid-


are to be broken until the laws


are off the books."


Community Outraged


As a consequence of those re-


marks a public clamor for Me-


zey's dismissal arose both within


and without the college commun-


ity. A Superior Court judge, for


example, wrote to President Ness


and stated that Mezey was un-


dermining his juvenile court


work. The judge said, "I do not


propose to permit him to destroy


the work of the Juvenile Court


and contribute to the delin-


quency of minors by using his


high position as a professor at


a college and the prestige which


flows from that position to de-


stroy the future lives of the teen-


agers of this community .. . I,


therefore urge that Professor -


Mezey be removed from the staff


of your college as one who is


unfit to occupy the teaching pro-


fession." Similar letters were ad-


dressed to Ness and to the Fac-


ulty Personnel Committee by


members of the Fresno State


College academic community.


Support From Own Department


The English Department was


asked to investigate Mezey and


issue an evaluation report in


light of the complaints that had


been received. The English De- .


partment and the Dean of the


School of Arts and Sciences con-


ducted the requested investiga-


tion and reached the conclusion


that Mezey was an outstanding


teacher and that the complaints


against Mezey were asking the


English Department to punish


Mezey for an exercise of his


right to freedom of speech guar-


anteed by the First Amendment.


Accordingly, the Department of


English recommended Mezey's


retention,


Personnel Committee


The recommendation was


made to the College Personnel


Committee. The Personnel Com-


mittee, in violation of its own


rules, held an in camera hearing


on the issue of whether Mezey,


by his statements at the "panel


on pot,' had engaged in "unpro-


fessional conduct.'' At the con-


ACLU NEWS


DECEMBER, 1968


Page 4


clusion of the hearing the Com-


mittee recommended to Presi-


dent Ness that Mezey not be re-


tained. The recommendation was


unaccompanied by any reasons


and was not, as the college rules


provided, referred back to the


English Department.


President Investigates


Because of the infirmities in


the Personnel Committee hear-


ing Ness decided that he could


not rely upon their recommenda-


tion and decided to conduct an


investigation of his own. He got


together with the English De-


partment and with Mezey in pri-


vate "off the record" meetings


that were devoted almost entire-


ly to Mezey's social and political


views. When those meetings


were concluded, Ness sent a let-


ter to Mezey informing him that


he would not be retained for the


1968-1969 academic year. That


letter, once again in violation of


college rules, contained no rea-


sons for the termination.


Special Panel


Because the procedures in the


Mezey case had been so irregu-


lar, the Fresno State College


Academic Senate convened a spe-


cial panel to hear the Mezey


grievance and to make yet an-


other recommendation to the


President on the question of


`Mezey's retention, The panel


heard testimony from Mezey,


members of the Department of


English, and Dr. Ness and de-


termined that Mezey's grievance


was well-founded and that Mezey


should be retained. President


Ness responded to this recom-


mendation by sending Mezey an-


other letter of termination un-


accompanied by any reason.


ACLU Contentions


The ACLUNC petition on be-


half of Mezey contends that:


Mezey is not being retained


because he expressed views on


issues of contemporary signifi-


cance which were controversial.


Mezey is not being retained be-


cause he exercised his right to


freedom of speech guaranteed


him by the First Amendment tc


the United States Constitution.


The decision of the Dept. of


English to retain Mr. Mezey was


improperly rejected. The only


body that has reviewed Mr.


Mezey's professional ability, the


English Department, has recom-


mended retention. The only body


that has reviewed the procedures


surrounding the decision to dis-


miss Mezey, the grievance panel,


has recommended retention. Both


recommendations were rejected.


by Ness in decisions that con-


tain no reasons, |


Every procedural device de-


veloped to ensure proper con-


sideration of a departmental reg-


ulation has been violated in the


Mezey case.


The reason that the procedures


in the Mezey case were so tor-


tured is because the due process


system was under stress. It was


under stress because Mezey was


being dismissed for an improper


reason,


Legal Action Authorized


At this writing there has been


no response from the Chancel-


lor's office to the petition on be-


half of Mezey. If Chancellor


Dumke should decide not to re-


verse President Ness's decision,


the ACLUNC Board of Directors -


has authorized Halvonik to file


suit on Mezey's behalf. :


xcerpts From


eath Penalty


pinions


Continued from Page 3-


severely attacked. But no one


knows which of these notions.


and as many others as the mind


can conjure, are accidently


seized upon by judge or jury to


grant or deny life. No one knows


what moves judge or jury to se-


lect a capital defendant for


death. We know only that the


motives and notions that deal out


death are as obscure, disordered,


and irrational as the statistical


incidence of the death penalty


itself. . . . Yet the foundation


rock of the law is reason; the


judicial process presupposes


"that its determinations are jus-


tified only when explained or


explainable in reason... .


The irrational process of de-


creeing death cannot be recon-


ciled with a sense of reasoned


justice; we cannot explain why


or when we impose the penalty.


If a civilized society cannot say


why one man should be executed


and another not, it does not ra-


tionally, logically, take life. In-


stead, it grossly denies due proc-


ess of law in inflicting death


upon the basis of a trial that is


capricious, discriminatory, and


guess-infected.


I therefore dissent from the


court's ruling on the constitu-


tionality of the death penalty,


but concur in the opinion on the


issues. (Justice Tobriner's opin-


ion covers 67 pages.)


Concurring And Dissenting


Opinion By McComb, J.


For all the reasons set forth


in Mr. Justice Burke's opinion,


I concur in the decision of the


majority of this court that the


death penalty is constitutional


and does not constitute cruel or


unusual punishment, that Penal


Code sections 190 and 190.1 are


valid, and that petitioners will


be afforded the services of coun-


sel in all proceedings between


the termination of their state ap-


peals and their execution. I re-


spectfully dissent from that por-


tion thereof that sets aside the


death penalties under the com-


pulsion. of Witherspoon v. Illi-


nois....


Berk. Emergency


Cases Dismissed


Continued from Page 2-


George Brunn decided that if the


district attorney did not feel he


could prosecute the defendants


under the City's interpretation


of its regulations that the cases


should be dismissed. Brunn by


dismissing the cases avoided


making any decision about the


constitutionality of the Berkeley


ordinance,


The defendants in the Berkeley


"Emergency' 'cases were repre-


sented by Berkeley volunteer at-


torneys Larry Duga, Albert Ben-


dich, Ken Kawaichi, Demitrios


Agretilis and staff counsel Paul


Halvonik.


Denial of Fair


Hearing in


Security Case


On October 30, Federal Judge


George Harris set aside an order


discharging Arthur R. Grimm


from the Air Force. He was


also restored to the rank he


held prior to his discharge.


Grimm had been charged,


among other things with a se-


curity violation in 1963. In de-


fiance of its own regulation, the


Air Force failed to give Grimm


an unclassified summary of an


Office of Special Investigations


report of the alleged security


violation. The information was


finally provided at an appellate


stage of the proceedings.


_ The court noted that Grimm


"was deprived of an opportunity


to confront witnesses, if any,


against him on the _ security


charge, as well as the failure


on the part of defendants to


furnish him with an unclassified


summary of the OSI report."


Separation of Spouses


Canditions


Of Probation


ACLUNC has asked the Supreme Court of California to


review and reverse a Court of Appeal decision upholding as


constitutional certain conditions of the probation of Aneta


Peeler.


Aneta Peeler pleaded guilty last April to a charge of


possessing marijuana. She was


granted probation for a period


of three years on the condition


that she be incarcerated in the


Butte County jail for 30 days,


that during the first year of the


probationary period she remain


in residence with her parents


and that she not associate with


any known users of marijuana.


Newly Married


On the day prior to her pro-


bation hearing she had married


a Mr. James Peeler, She did not


mention her marriage at the


hearing because when, before


the hearing, she had asked her


attorney how he thought the


court might feel about a "possi-


ble marriage" to Peeler her at-


torney had told her that he be-


lieved that Peeler was involved


in narcotics and that mention of


his name might. jeopardize her


chances for probation.


Court Relief Sought


When Mrs. Peeler concluded


her jail term she petitioned the


court to remove those conditions


of probation which inhibited her


marriage. In addition to the re-


quirement that she reside with


her parents, the condition that


she not associate with any


"known users of marijuana' in-


hibited her marriage because her


husband had been arrested on a-


marijuana offense.


Conditions Extended


The court did not grant Mrs.


Peeler's petition; instead it or-


dered petitioner spend another


60 days in jail and amended the


condition requiring her to avoid


association with "known" users


of marijuana by adding an in-


terdiction of any association with


"reputed" users of marijuana or


drugs. :


Separation Required


The Court of Appeal noted


that the amended condition of


probation "was, effectually, a


command that she live apart


from her husband," but, never-


theless, held that the condition


was constitutional] because it was


"reasonable and relevant to the


offense for which probation was


granted" and because "probation


is not a right but an act of grace


and clemency."


The ACLUNC petition, pre-


pared by staff Counsel Paul Hal-


vonik, contends that the Court


of Appeal applied the wrong


legal principles in the Peeler


case, "A finding that a condition


annexed to the receipt of a pub-


The first right of a citizen


Ts the right


To be responsible


AMERICAN CIVIL


OF NORTHERN


lic benefit is `reasonable and rele-


vant' cannot justify that condi-


tion where fundamental liberties


are involved. The condition can


only be sustained where there


is a showing of a compelling


subordinating state interest."


The brief goes on to note that


the United States Supreme Court


has recognized that the right to


marriage is a fundamental right


guaranteed by the United States


Constitution and that there is no


legitimate state interest that


would justify such a sweeping


inhibition of the marriage rela-


tionship.


Charges Against


Assistant U.S.


Attorney


Continued from Page 2-


Removal Threatened


Ladar then undertook to ad-


vise the lady about her rights.


Besig said this wasn't necessary


and that he should serve the


subpoena. Ladar replied that


unless Besig kept quiet he would


call the Marshal and have him


removed for obstructing justice.


The subpoena was finally


turned over to the lady and Besig


then asked that the passport be


returned as had been agreed,


Ladar said he wasn't going to re-


turn the passport. Besig stated


that was dishonest. Ladar


shrugged his shoulders and he


and Mr. Hennessey walked- off,


The lady's subpoena was re-


turnable on November 27. She


was scheduled to be represented


by Paul N. Halvonik, ACLU staff


counsel,


Protest to Poole


On November. 12, Besig talked


on the telephone with Cecil


Poole, U.S. Attorney, concerning


Ladar's conduct and it was un-


derstood that Poole would look


into the matter. Poole suggested


that under the law the passport


should be turned over to the


Passport Division of the State


Department as having been lost.


Besig insisted that the FBI had


unlawfully taken the passport.


At this writing, no further


word has been heard from Mr.


Poole. Telephone calls have gone


unanswered. If nothing is heard


from Mr. Poole the ACLU will


contact the Attorney General.


Appropriate action will also be


taken to secure the return of


the passport.


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